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Siege Starvation: A War Crime of Societal Torture
Tom Dannenbaum

Abstract
A recent amendment to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court has drawn
unprecedented attention to the war crime of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. It
comes at a time when mass starvation in war is resurgent, devastating populations in Yemen,
Ethiopia, Syria, South Sudan, Nigeria, and elsewhere. The practice has also drawn the scrutiny
of the United Nations Security Council. And yet, despite this heightened profile and sharpened
urgency, what precisely is criminally wrongful about starvation methods remains underspecified.
A common way of thinking about the criminal wrong is as a form of killing or harming
civilians. Although its differentiating particularities matter, the basic wrongfulness of the crime
inheres, on this view, in it being an attack on those who ought not be attacked. For some, this
supports a broad interpretation of the starvation ban. However, for others, the graduality of
starvation preserves the continuous possibility of the avoidance or minimization of civilian death
or harm in a way that direct kinetic attacks do not. In combination with the method’s purported
military utility, this distinctive incrementalism has underpinned arguments for the permissibility
of certain forms of siege and other deprivation and a narrow interpretation of the starvation crime.
Drawing on the moral philosophy of torture, this Article offers a different normative theory
of the crime. Starvation, like torture, is peculiarly wrongful in its distortion of victims’ biological
imperatives against their capacities to formulate and act on higher-order desires, political
commitments, and even love. This process does not merely raise the cost of fulfilling those
commitments. Instead, starvation tears gradually at the very capacity of those affected to prioritize
their most fundamental commitments, regardless of whether they would choose to do so under the
conditions necessary to evaluate matters with a “contemplative attitude.” Rather than palliating,
the slowness of starvation methods is at the crux of this torturous wrong. Recognizing this redefines
the meaning and place of the crime in the framework of international criminal law.
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I. I NTRODU C TION
In 2019, the 123 States Parties to the International Criminal Court (ICC)
approved a statutory amendment incorporating the war crime of starvation of
civilians as a method of warfare in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs).1
The new provision marks the first step towards closing a consequential gap in the
ICC system.2 Prior to the amendment, the Rome Statute had criminalized the
practice only in international armed conflicts (IACs)—the decidedly less common
of the two categories of contemporary war.3
The change comes at a moment when the infliction of mass starvation in
war is resurgent.4 Millions of civilians across multiple conflicts have suffered
severe deprivation,5 often in ways that are attributable directly to the strategies of

1

Resolution on Amendments to Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
ICC-ASP/18/Res.5 (Dec. 6, 2019); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art.
8(2)(e)(xix), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (last amended Dec. 6, 2019, depository notification
C.N.394.2020.TREATIES-XVIII.10.g) [hereinafter Rome Statute].

2

It is just the first step because the amendment will only enter into force on a state-by-state basis, as
States Parties ratify the amendment individually. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 121(5).
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(xxv). The amendment had been proposed by Switzerland.
See Annex IV, in Int’l Criminal Ct. Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Working Group on
Amendments, ICC-ASP/17/35 (December 5–12, 2018); Int’l Criminal Ct. Assembly of States Parties,
Report of the Working Group on Amendments, ICC-ASP/18/32 (Dec. 3, 2019). On the pre-history to
this codification, see Nicholas Mulder & Boyd van Dijk, Why Did Starvation Not Become the
Paradigmatic War Crime?, in CONTINGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 370 (Kevin Jon Heller & Ingo
Venzke eds., 2021). On the peculiar lack of clarity regarding the reasons for the initial restriction of
the crime to IACs, see infra note 50.
On the resurgence, see ALEX DE WAAL, MASS STARVATION: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF FAMINE
ch. 10 (2018). On the history of starvation tactics in war, see, for example, id. ch. 4; Esbjörn
Rosenblad, Starvation as a Method of Warfare: Conditions for Regulation by Convention, 7 INT'L LAWYER
252, 255–56 (1973); Charles A. Allen, Civilian Starvation and Relief during Armed Conflict: The Modern
Humanitarian Law, 19 GA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 4–8, 31–32 (1989); James Kraska, Siege, in MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶¶ 3, 8 (2009); Wolff Heintschel von
Heinegg, Blockade, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶¶ 6–22
(2015); Bridget Conley and Alex de Waal, The Purposes of Starvation, 17 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 699, 709–
11 (2019).
In 2017, the Security Council was briefed that more than 20 million people across conflicts in
Somalia, Yemen, South Sudan, and Nigeria “face[d] starvation and famine.” Associated Press, World
Faces Worst Humanitarian Crisis since 1945, says UN Official, GUARDIAN (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://perma.cc/LD78-3Q5D. Alex de Waal described O’Brien’s framing as “hyperbolic” but
agreed that “2017 marks a critical turning point, a moment at which famine could return.” DE
WAAL, supra note 4, at 154. Briefings in 2020 were similarly dire. Mark Lowcock,
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Remarks to
the Security Council on “Protection of civilians in armed conflict: indispensable civilian objects”
(Apr. 27, 2021), https://perma.cc/Y2XW-GQJD; Peter Maurer, President of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, Remarks to the U.N. Security Council Open Debate on the Protection
of Objects Indispensable to the survival of the civilian population (April 27, 2021),
https://perma.cc/P2M5-HSRA.

3

4

5
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the belligerent parties.6 Isolated by a Saudi- and Emirati-led blockade on one side
and subject to the confiscation of food and medicine by the Houthis on the other,
the people of Yemen have endured years of what remains one of the world’s
gravest humanitarian crises.7 In Myanmar, the destruction, pillage, and denial of
food and other essentials have been key components of the military’s
counterinsurgency strategy, contributing to the ethnic cleansing and alleged
genocide of the Rohingya population.8 In 2020, almost half of the population of
South Sudan was in “crisis” or worse due to food deprivation arising in significant
part from the actions of the warring parties.9 The Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on Syria has described “modern day sieges in which
perpetrators deliberately starved the population along medieval scripts,” imposing
“indefensible and shameful restrictions on humanitarian aid.”10 Most recently,
Ethiopian and Eritrean belligerents have used a range of starvation tactics in

6

7

8

9

10

See DE WAAL, supra note 4, at 6–7. For earlier iterations of the claim that famine is caused by political
choices, see ALEX DE WAAL, FAMINE CRIMES: POLITICS AND THE DISASTER RELIEF INDUSTRY IN
AFRICA 7 (1997); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 175 (1999); David Marcus, Famine
Crimes in International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 245, 245 (2003).
See Hannah Summers, Yemen on Brink of 'World's Worst Famine In 100 Years' If War Continues,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/Z6NL-3UUR; Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the
Detailed Findings of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen, ¶¶ 768–
71, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/42/CRP .1* (Sept. 3, 2019) [hereinafter, Group of Experts on Yemen,
Detailed Findings (2019)]; Jane Ferguson, Is Intentional Starvation the Future of War?, NEW YORKER
(July 11, 2018). In 2019, World Food Programme spokesperson Herve Verhoosel warned that
approximately 10 million Yemenis were “one step away from famine.” 10 Million Yemenis ‘One Step
Away from Famine’, UN Food Agency Calls for ‘Unhindered Access” to Frontline Regions, U.N. NEWS (Mar.
26, 2019), https://perma.cc/9Q2Y-P7TH. Cuts to essential aid and the COVID-19 pandemic
exacerbated the crisis, see generally Vivian Yee, Yemen Aid Falls Short, Threatening Food and Health
Programs, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/HQX4-8CAM; Mark Lowcock,
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Briefing to
the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in Yemen (Apr. 15, 2021),
https://perma.cc/F6KK-VN7S (describing the situation in Yemen as “the world’s largest
humanitarian crisis” and one that was “getting worse”).
See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Council, Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding
Mission on Myanmar, ¶¶ 10, 49–50, 411, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/42/CRP.5 (Sept. 16, 2019)
[hereinafter, IIFFMM, Detailed Findings (2019)]; Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Detailed Findings
of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, ¶¶ 1367–69, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/39/CRP.2 (Sept 17, 2018) [hereinafter, IIFFMM, Detailed Findings (2018)]; Andray
Abrahamian, The Tamadaw Returns to the ‘Four Cuts’ Doctrine, INTERPRETER (Sept. 4, 2017),
https://perma.cc/9X2W-6Q7S.
Comm’n. on Hum. Rts. South Sudan, “There Is Nothing Left For Us”: Starvation As a Method of Warfare
in South Sudan, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/45/CRP.3 (Oct. 5, 2020).
Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian
Arab Republic ¶ 96, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/46/54 (Jan. 21, 2021) [hereinafter IICISyria Report 2021].
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Tigray in what has quickly become one of the world’s most severe humanitarian
catastrophes.11
It is in this context that the starvation crime will take shape. The agreement
on the new ICC provision was preceded by a landmark resolution in which the
U.N. Security Council “strongly condemn[ed]” starvation methods in armed
conflict and warned that they “may constitute a war crime.”12 There is now an
unprecedented level of attention among academics and practitioners on a criminal
prohibition that had been dormant and largely ignored since its first treaty
codification (in IAC form) in 1998.13
And yet, much remains uncertain. In light of the IAC crime’s dormancy and
the NIAC crime’s recency, there is not the case law or broader jurisprudence that
might help to settle incipient, but consequential interpretive disputes.14 Particularly
thorny are questions around intent and purpose. Views differ as to whether the
crime would attach to the act of blocking the delivery of essentials, such as food
and water, to an encircled and starving population when that obstruction is
performed with the goal of starving out ensconced enemy forces.15 On one view,
for the crime to attach, it would need to be established that the besieging party
acted with a view to weaponizing the attendant civilian suffering. On an alternative
view, engaging in deprivation with the knowledge that it would cause civilians to
starve would suffice. These views diverge significantly in terms of both the range
of operations to which the crime might attach and the subset for which
prosecution would be viable from an evidentiary perspective.
11

12
13

14

15

See WORLD PEACE FOUND., STARVING TIGRAY: HOW ARMED CONFLICT AND MASS ATROCITIES
HAVE DESTROYED AN ETHIOPIAN REGION’S ECONOMY AND FOOD SYSTEM AND ARE
THREATENING FAMINE 23–52 (2021), https://perma.cc/ENL6-HK5A; Tom Dannenbaum, Famine
in Tigray, Humanitarian Access, and the War Crime of Starvation, JUST SEC. (July 26, 2021),
https://perma.cc/LZ76-XLAB.
S.C. Res. 2417 (May 24, 2018).
The IAC codification at the ICC, supra note 3, was the first codification of the starvation crime in
an international instrument. Exemplifying the renewed attention, see generally Special Issue Starvation
in International Law, 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 673–929 (2019); A Pandemic of Hunger: Implementing UN
Security Council Resolution 2417, GLOB. RTS. COMPLIANCE (May 2021), https://perma.cc/54CZ7HEB.
For a limited domestic exception to the lack of case law, see Public Prosecutor v. M.P. et al (K.
74/96), verdict, District Court in Zadar, Croatia (Apr. 24, 1997), unofficial translation of the verdict
available at https://perma.cc/U4M9-HC54. The Swedish Prosecution Authority’s recently
announced intention to prosecute Lundin Oil AB executives for complicity in alleged war crimes
in Sudan between 1999 and 2003 includes mention of the “burning [of] . . . crops so that people
did not have anything to live by” as a “grave war crime[].” Press Release, Åklagarmyndigheten
(Swedish Prosecution Authority), Prosecution for Complicity in Grave War Crimes in Sudan (Nov.
11, 2021), https://perma.cc/8ZQC-SM6T. However, it does not appear that this will be prosecuted
as the specific crime of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. For a comprehensive overview
of jurisprudence relevant to starvation, see Starvation Jurisprudence Digest, GLOB. RTS. COMPLIANCE,
https://perma.cc/27RQ-JAWJ.
See infra Section II.B.
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But confusion is not confined to questions of interpretation. Underpinning
those disputes lies a deeper lack of normative clarity as to what the starvation
crime is really about. Those who assert a narrow definition of the legal prohibition
tend to invoke military necessity as an underlying principle of international
humanitarian law (IHL) and the guiding norm in this instance.16 Siege, they argue,
is an essential tool of warcraft and cannot be performed effectively without the
complete sequestration of the entire encircled population. Whatever one makes
of the empirical assumptions embedded in that claim, it raises further normative
questions. The invocation of necessity is compelling only if the pro tanto wrong
associated with inflicting starvation conditions on civilians is of a kind that is
amenable to a necessity justification in the first place. Whether it is depends in
part on what makes starving civilians as a method of warfare criminally wrongful.17
A potent normative account of the starvation crime would explain not just
why the conduct is condemnable, but why it warrants a criminal prohibition
separate and distinct from other potentially applicable war crimes or crimes
against humanity, such as attacking civilians, murder, extermination, forced
displacement, or willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health.18 Distilling that normative core is important both for honing international
criminal law’s message in starvation cases and for clarifying what is at stake in
interpretive disputes regarding the scope of the crime.19
With that in mind, this Article analyzes criminality in the context of siege
starvation—the encircling and cutting off of a defended and populated locality in
order to elicit the capitulation of the besieged party and thereby avoid the need to
take the area by assault.20 To focus on this specific form of the method is neither
to ignore other modalities of starvation warfare, 21 nor to dismiss the use of mass
16
17

18

19
20

21

See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III. On the notion of a normative account of an international crime, see, for
example, Tom Dannenbaum, Why Have We Criminalized Aggressive War?, 126 YALE L.J. 1242, 1249–
54 (2017).
On identifying various paths to criminal accountability for the infliction of mass starvation, see, for
example, Federica D’Alessandra & Matthew Gillett, The War Crime of Starvation in Non-International
Armed Conflict, 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 815, 826 (2019); Rogier Bartels, Denying Humanitarian Access as
an International Crime in Times of Non-International Armed Conflict, 48 ISRAEL L. REV. 281, 299–301
(2015).
See infra Sections II.B, III.D, III.F.
There is no legal definition of “siege” or “encirclement” (unlike blockade). On the legal elements
of blockade, see SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS
AT SEA ¶¶ 93–104 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995); Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval
War, Feb. 26, 1909, 208 Consol. T.S. 338, reprinted in THE DECLARATION OF LONDON 112, arts. 1–
21. (James B. Scott ed., 1919).
Other modalities may be part of encirclement warfare but can also occur independently. They
include attacks on humanitarian workers; the destruction, looting, or rendering useless of livestock,
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starvation to punish, subjugate, or exterminate.22 It is instead to respond to the
status of encirclement deprivation as both the quintessential form of starvation as
a method of warfare—prevalent historically23 and today24—and the form most
likely to be defended, legally and morally.25 With sieges arguably becoming “a
defining feature of modern warfare,”26 encirclement deprivation is the form most
capable of shedding light on the normative underpinnings of the starvation crime.
The most straightforward way of thinking about starving civilians as a
method of warfare is as a specific instantiation of the broader criminal category of
attacks on civilians. Indeed, this appears to be the standard view of the crime. 27
Although recognizing the distinctive features of starvation, this conceptualization

22

23
24

25
26

27

crops, farmland, fishing systems, water and irrigation infrastructure, markets, and humanitarian aid;
the impeding of pastoralists’ rights of free movement; the disruption of coping strategies; and
attacks on civilians seeking to access essentials. See Tom Dannenbaum, Starvation in an Age of Mass
Deprivation in War, 54 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming 2022).
Bridget Conley and Alex de Waal identify nine reasons that those with the power to do so inflict
starvation on others: (i) extermination or genocide; (ii) control through weakening a population; (iii)
gaining territorial control; (iv) flushing out a population; (v) punishment; (vi) material extraction or
theft; (vii) extreme exploitation; (viii) war provisioning; and (ix) comprehensive societal
transformation. Conley & de Waal, supra note 4.
See supra note 4.
See generally Comm’n. on Hum. Rts. South Sudan, supra note 9, ¶¶ 101, 105–06, 109, 124–27;
IIFFMM, Detailed Findings (2019), supra note 8, ¶¶ 156–60, 168–69, 584–85 (impediments to
transferring essentials or delivering humanitarian aid), 404–06 (import bans); IIFFMM, Detailed
Findings (2018), supra note 8, ¶¶ 575–77 (denial of humanitarian access), 1165–68 (encirclement);
Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Libya, ¶¶ 21, 88, 90, 128, 160, 542, 563,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/68 (Mar. 2, 2012); IICISyria Report 2021, supra note 10, ¶¶ 39, 46; Hum.
Rts. Council, Findings of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/43 (Aug. 17, 2018); Rep. of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan (2020),
transmitted by Letter dated 14 January 2020 from the Panel of Experts. Established Pursuant to
Resolution 1591 (2005) Concerning the Sudan Addressed to the President of the Security Council,
¶ 132, U.N. Doc. S/2020/36 (Jan. 14, 2020); Rep. of the Panel of Experts on Somalia (2020),
transmitted by Letter dated 28 September 2020 from the Chairman of the Security Council Comm.
Established Pursuant to Resolution 751 (1992) Concerning Somalia Addressed to the President of
the Security Council, ¶ 124, U.N. Doc. S/2020/949 (Sept. 28, 2020); MARTHA MUNDY, REPORT
STRATEGIES OF THE COALITION IN THE YEMEN WAR 2–3, 7 (Oct. 9, 2018),
https://perma.cc/V9DT-SUJL; AMNESTY INT’L, WE LEAVE OR WE DIE: FORCED DISPLACEMENT
UNDER SYRIA’S RECONCILIATION AGREEMENTS 18 (2017) https://perma.cc/FK8L-GBDR;
Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 208, 937 (Dec. 12, 2007);
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 26, 28, 566 (Aug. 2, 2001); Prosecutor v.
Karadžić, Case No. MICT-13-55-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 565–73 (Mechanism for Int'l Crim. Tribs. Mar.
20, 2019).
See infra Sections II.B–III.A.
Amos C. Fox, The Reemergence of the Siege, 18 INST. LAND WARFARE 2 (2018). Others suggest that
siege warfare is poised to become “even more relevant” over time. Lionel M. Beehner, Benedetta
Berti, & Michael T. Jackson, The Strategic Logic of Sieges in Counterinsurgencies, 47 PARAMETERS 77, 78
(2017).
See infra Section IV.
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identifies the method’s wrongfulness as inhering fundamentally in it being an
attack on those who ought not be attacked.
This way of understanding the crime can be taken in divergent interpretive
directions. On the one hand, it might be thought to underpin a categorical
prohibition of encirclement starvation on the analogical basis that it would be
prohibited to subject an identical besieged population to kinetic attack without
discriminating between its civilian and combatant constituencies.28 On the other
hand, some might single starvation out among attacks on civilians on the grounds
that its slow and incremental nature allows for civilian harm to be avoided or
minimized in a way that kinetic attacks preclude.29 That, in turn, might be thought
to open the door to the justificatory invocation of necessity, particularly in
contexts in which civilians would not be the specific targets of the operation.
Whatever one makes of those divergent lines of reasoning, the central claim
of this Article is that their shared normative premise is incomplete. Plainly, the
fact that criminal starvation methods can be characterized as harmful and lethal
attacks on civilians is an important aspect of their criminality. However, that
framing risks obscuring an additional dimension of the wrong—one that is
particularly potent in explaining the independent criminalization of starvation
methods and in clarifying the normative implications of the method’s graduality.
This dimension is best illuminated by way of a societal analogy to torture. 30
Both torture and encirclement starvation involve the infliction of suffering
(and potentially death). However, the feature that sets these crimes apart from the
other legal categories under which they could be prosecuted is the way that these
methods turn victims’ biological imperatives against their fundamental capacities
to formulate and act on higher-order desires, political commitments, and even
love.31 The process is not simply coercive; the distortion of biological imperatives
does not merely raise the cost of fulfilling higher-order commitments. Instead, it
slowly crowds out the capacity of victims to decide whether to do so.
Seen in this way, the graduality of starvation, as compared to other forms of
attack, is not a mitigating factor that opens the possibility of harm minimization
and thus permissibility. Rather, it is central to the distinctively torturous wrong
that defines the method. Starvation tears gradually at the capacity of those affected
to prioritize their most fundamental commitments, regardless of whether they
would choose to do so under the conditions necessary to evaluate matters with a
“contemplative attitude.”32 This process works only through the incremental and
sustained accumulation of suffering and the imperative to break free from it.

31

See infra text accompanying notes 216–22.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section VI.
See infra Sections V–VI.

32

See infra note 293 and accompanying text.

28
29
30
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In advancing this theory of the crime, the Article proceeds as follows.
Section II provides a brief outline of the legal framework and some of the key
doctrinal debates regarding the scope of the crime. Section III identifies the
normative role of military necessity in underpinning arguments for a narrow
prohibition, emphasizes the need to consider necessity in light of the moral stakes
of the conduct in question, and situates that endeavor within a theory of
international criminal law as an expressive regime. Section IV elaborates what
appears to be both the standard account of the wrong underpinning the starvation
crime and the account assumed by those who argue for its narrow scope on
necessity grounds. Section V considers the relevance of the moral philosophy of
torture in illuminating its criminal wrongfulness and responding to the use of
necessity by torture advocates. Section VI draws on that philosophical insight to
offer a normative account of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare,
framing it as a war crime of societal torture. Section VII situates that insight in the
framework of international criminal law as a whole.

II. T HE S TARVATION C RIME AND I NTE RP RE TIVE
C ONTROVE RSY
A. The Legal Context
Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is a relative latecomer to
international criminal law. The innovative charge of “[d]eliberate starvation of
civilians” was considered fleetingly when the Allies were planning to prosecute
their defeated foes after World War I,33 but international prosecution efforts
collapsed, and the crime was never established.34 Two and a half decades later,
senior Nazi defendants were convicted at Nuremberg of starving prisoners of war,
occupied populations, the enslaved, and others under their control.35 However,
starvation in the conduct of hostilities was treated quite differently. Members of
the German High Command were acquitted of any legal violation arising from the
siege of Leningrad, in which over one million Russians died. 36 The American-run
33

Report of the Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (March 29, 1919), reprinted in 14
AM J. INT’L L. 95, 114 (1920).

34

On the efforts to pursue criminal justice for alleged German perpetrators after World War I, see
Matthias Neuner, When Justice Is Left to the Losers: The Leipzig War Crimes Trials, in 1 HISTORICAL
ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 333 (Morten Bergsmo, Cheah Wui Ling & Yi Ping,
eds., 2014); GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNALS ch. 3 (2002).
See, e.g., Judgment (Sept. 30, 1946), in 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, 411, 456, 472, 474, 478, 480, 482, 484, 495, 542–44, 541
(1948).

35

36

Id.

376

Vol. 22 No. 2

Siege Starvation

Dannenbaum

tribunal hearing the case affirmed the legal “propriety of attempting to reduce [a
place controlled by the enemy to] starvation,” holding that “the cutting off of
every source of sustenance from without” in such a context was fully compatible
with existing international law.37 It was a tactic the Allies had used themselves.38
Soon thereafter, international humanitarian law (IHL) underwent a
significant revision. However, except in the narrow context of belligerent
occupation,39 the Geneva Conventions of 1949 retained a permissive posture
towards starvation tactics.40 They require that parties allow “essential foodstuffs”
through to adversary territory only when those consignments are “intended for
children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases” and the besieging
party has no “serious reasons for fearing” that they may be diverted, controlled
ineffectively, or provide a “definite advantage” to the adversary by substituting for
goods that it would have provided.41 In the context of siege warfare, parties are
required only to “endeavour to conclude local agreements” for the removal of
“wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons, children and maternity cases”; there is
no requirement to succeed in those endeavors, no requirement to allow persons
in the protected categories out in the absence of an agreement, and no
requirement to even try to conclude agreements allowing other civilians to exit.42
The notion that starvation methods could qualify as a war crime remained a long
way off.43
It was not until the Additional Protocols were agreed in 1977 that this began
to change. Both Protocol I (for IACs) and Protocol II (for NIACs) proscribe
“starvation of civilians as a method of warfare [or combat].”44 The more detailed
37

38
39

40

41
42
43

44

United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al. (Oct. 27, 1948), in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 462, 555, 563 (1949)
(citing CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, 3 INTERNATIONAL LAW 1802–03 (2d ed. 1945)).
See Mulder & van Dijk, supra note 3, at 377–80.
Any power engaged in belligerent occupation of foreign territory has “the duty of ensuring the food
and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs,
medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.”
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 55, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]. It has a clear duty to consent to and
facilitate relief schemes (particularly of food, medical supplies, and clothing) for that population if
it is “inadequately supplied.” Id. art. 59.
See Marcus, supra note 6, at 266 (critiquing the Fourth Convention framework for non-occupied
territory); René Provost, Starvation as a Weapon, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 577, 592 (1992).
GC IV, supra note 39, art. 23.
Id. art. 17.
None of even the limited requirements related to starvation and humanitarian access were included
in the Fourth Convention’s grave breaches provision. Id. art. 147.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 54, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 3 [hereinafter AP
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Protocol I rule elaborates that it is prohibited to “destroy, remove or render
useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. . . . for the
specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian
population or to the adverse Party.”45 It clarifies that such deprivation is
permissible for the denial of sustenance if the objects are used solely by the armed
forces of the adversary and is permissible if done for reasons other than
sustenance and the action would not lead to civilian starvation or forced
movement.46 A separate provision specifies that if the civilian population in
non-occupied territory is inadequately supplied, “relief actions which are
humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any adverse
distinction shall be undertaken, subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned
in such relief actions.”47
The introduction of these rules shifted the law’s posture on starvation in
war. At the same time, the ban was excluded from the grave breaches provision
of Protocol I.48 As such, it remained a step removed from war crime status. It took
two more decades for the criminality of the method to be codified in an
international instrument. Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute proscribes
“[i]ntentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving
them of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief
supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions.”49 An equivalent
provision for NIACs was deleted late in the drafting process in what, remarkably,
appears to have been an administrative error.50 Given the prevalence of the

45
46
47
48
49
50

I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 14, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
609 [hereinafter AP II].
AP I, supra note 44, art. 54(2).
See id. art. 54(3).
Id. art. 70(1). See also AP II, supra note 44, art. 18.
See AP I, supra note 44, art. 85.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(xxv).
In the most compelling explanation, Rogier Bartels argues that the omission was likely “an
oversight, perhaps caused by the unfortunate placing of the proposed crime together with various
versions of disproportionate use of force,” which, unlike the starvation provision, lacked underlying
codification in Protocol II. Bartels, supra note 18, at 298. Ultimately, however, the reasons remain
hazy even for those who participated in the final Rome Conference. Panel on Starvation in Armed
Conflicts (panelists: Federica D’Alessandra, Brian Lander, Matthias Lanz & Charles Garraway)
Geneva Academy (May 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/RW6G-2T4Y (May 6, 2019) (Charles Garraway,
who was at the Rome Conference, at 28:50: “my own belief is it fell just below the threshold, bearing
in mind there were still states in Rome who were not prepared to accept any, any offenses [in
NIACs] except perhaps common article 3”; Matthias Lanz, having explored the travaux in
preparation for the 2018 Swiss proposal, at 36:18: “you find . . . no real information in the travaux
préparatoires on why this happened, so I think . . . it was chaotic and there was a lot of politics
involved is probably what comes closest to the truth. . . . We believe that [the NIAC draft provision]
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non-international form of armed conflict, this was a significant omission. A
further twenty years passed before it was remedied by amendment.51
The ICC, of course, is limited in its reach. Absent Security Council referral
or ad hoc state acceptance,52 the Court’s jurisdiction is restricted to crimes on the
territory, or perpetrated by a national, of one of the 123 States Parties.53 Under
current political conditions, this alone precludes ICC action in many of the current
or recent conflicts involving mass starvation.54 Moreover, pursuant to the Statute’s
onerous amendment process, the new NIAC provision will enter into force only
for States Parties that choose to ratify it.55 As such, allegations of the use of
starvation methods in the NIACs in Nigeria and Mali (both of which are ICC
States Parties) remain beyond the Court’s jurisdiction even after the amendment’s
incorporation into the Statute.56
However, the implications of starvation’s criminalization in the Rome
Statute are not defined by the jurisdictional and political limits of the ICC. Despite
the Court’s difficulties, the Statute remains the normative focal point of

51
52

53

54

55

56

was [deleted from what became the final Statute as] part of a bigger package where tradeoffs were
made.”); Michael Cottier & Emilia Richard, Article 8(2)(b)(xxv), in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 508, 510 (Otto Triffterer & Kai Ambos eds.,
3rd ed. 2016); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 285 (5th ed. 2017).
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(e)(xix).
Id. arts. 12(3), 13(b). Sudan’s recently announced cooperation with the ICC Prosecutor in the arrest
and transfer of Omar al-Bashir emphasizes the degree to which such contingencies can change
swiftly and unexpectedly. @IntlCrimCourt, TWITTER (Aug. 16, 2021, 11:16 PM)
https://perma.cc/8RMP-FGNH. As final editing on this Article was concluding, a coup in Sudan
has introduced further flux and uncertainty into that situation. See, e.g., Rebecca Hamilton, After the
Coup in Sudan: Key (Short-Term) Indicators for Democratic Survival, JUST SEC. (Oct. 25, 2021),
https://perma.cc/NJ6M-BLKX.
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 12–13 (providing for the Court’s jurisdiction in situations not
referred by the U.N. Security Council only when the crimes occur on the territory of a state party
or are perpetrated by the national of a State Party or any state that accepts the Court’s jurisdiction
on an ad hoc basis).
See supra notes 4–11. None of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Myanmar, South Sudan, Syria, or Yemen is party
to the Statute. Nor are the vast majority of states that have participated in the war in Yemen,
including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 121(5). For the current list of ratifying states, see Amendment to article
8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Intentionally using starvation of civilians), U. N.
TREATY COLLECTION, https://perma.cc/P7X5-5FQR. Criticizing this aspect of the amendment
system, see Kevin Jon Heller, The Rome Statute’s Flawed Amendment Regime: Starvation in NIAC Edition,
OPINIO JURIS (Dec. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/PA5X-L53E.
See, e.g., Displaced in Northeast Nigeria ‘Knocking on Door of Starvation’: WFP, U.N. NEWS (Oct. 15, 2021),
https://perma.cc/KY65-2MP3; Rep. of the Panel of Experts on Mali (2020), transmitted by Letter
dated 7 August 2020 from the Panel of Experts. Established Pursuant to Resolution 2374 (2017)
and Extended by Resolution 2484 (2019) Concerning Mali Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, ¶¶ 129–35, U.N. Doc. S/2020/785/Rev.1 (Aug. 7, 2020).
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international criminal law.57 The 1998 codification alone had a catalytic legislative
effect. Many states quickly replicated the Rome Statute’s list of international
crimes in their domestic penal codes, which often provide for universal or
extended jurisdiction.58 Hybrid, special, and regional tribunals have also drawn on
the Rome Statute for their lists of crimes.59 As a result, the starvation crime is now
available in a range of jurisdictions not bound by the specific constraints of the
ICC.
Some of these states and authorities followed the initial Rome Statute focus
on starvation in the IAC context. However, others, including the Malabo Protocol
for the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, have incorporated the war
crime for both conflict classifications.60 In those that restricted jurisdiction to the
IAC crime, the recent amendment to the Rome Statute can be expected to have a
catalytic effect on legislative expansion to cover NIAC starvation crimes.
Similarly, hybrid, special, and regional tribunals created post-2019 are now more
likely to include the starvation crime for both IACs and NIACs.61

57

58

59

60

61

On the Court’s difficulties, see, for example, Independent Expert Review of the International
Criminal Court and the Rome Statute System: Final Report, ICC-ASP/19/16 (Sept. 30, 2020);
Douglas Guilfoyle, This is Not Fine: The International Criminal Court in Trouble, Parts I-III, EJIL:TALK!
(Mar. 2019), https://perma.cc/7YZV-GNBN. On the enduring significance of the Statute, see, for
example, Alex Whiting, Crime of Aggression Activated at the ICC: Does it Matter?, JUST SEC. (Dec. 19,
2017), https://perma.cc/2GHC-U9BA.
See generally National Implementing Legislation Database, INT’L CRIM. CT. LEGAL TOOLS DATABASE,
https://perma.cc/2Z5D-UAPS; ICRC, Practice Relating to Rule 53. Starvation as a Method of Warfare,
https://perma.cc/SD6U-Y5C6.
See, e.g., U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor, Regulation No. 2000/15 on the
Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offenses, art.
6(1)(b)(xxv), U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June 6, 2000); The Statute of the Iraqi Special
Tribunal of 2003, art. 13(b)(xxv); Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office
No. 05/L-053 of 2015, art. 14(1)(b)(xxv) (Kos.).
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human
Rights, Annex: Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights, arts.
28D(b)(xxvi), 28D(e)(xvi), June 27, 2014. The Malabo Protocol has yet to enter into force. Based
on a search of the ICC legal tools database (at legal-tools.org), and the ICRC’s customary IHL
database (ICRC, supra note 58) states codifying starvation as a war crime, regardless of conflict
classification include: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Ethiopia, Norway, the
Philippines, Rwanda, Spain. States that provide explicitly that starvation can be perpetrated in a
NIAC include: Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Germany, Kosovo, the Netherlands, Peru, Portugal,
Philippines, South Korea, Switzerland, Uruguay. See also D’Alessandra & Gillett, supra note 18, at
820 n.20 (also including Austria, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Sweden).
See Comm’n. on Hum. Rts. South Sudan, supra note 9, ¶ 148(e), recommending the inclusion of the
war crime of starvation as a method of warfare in the Statute of the promised (but not yet created)
Hybrid Court for South Sudan. On the status of the court, see Nyagoa Tut Pur, A Glimmer of Hope
for South Sudan’s Victims, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 31, 2021), https://perma.cc/P7XA-VDA7;
Robbie Gramer, U.S. Quietly Gives Up on South Sudan War Crimes Court, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 20,
2021), https://perma.cc/2TS9-WRC9.
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The fact of the Rome Statute amendment can also help to amplify political
and civil society scrutiny of starvation in war. As just one element of the
unprecedented treaty agreed in Rome in 1998, the initial IAC provision was
quickly forgotten and has rarely been invoked. The 2019 amendment, on the other
hand, has been incorporated at a time when the practice of starvation in war is
resurgent and has drawn the attention of a wide range of actors, from civil society
groups to the Security Council.62 The new amendment has already been invoked
in key expert reports regarding ongoing conflicts.63 As the legal and political
implications of the starvation war crime develop further, much will turn on how
the prohibition is understood and used.

B. Interpretive Ambiguity and Controversy
Perhaps the most consequential question in interpreting the crime is how to
think about intent, purpose, and method in the deprivation of objects that sustain
both combatants and civilians.64 Divergent views on that question have profound
implications for whether and under what conditions siege warfare can be waged
without implicating international criminal law.
At one end of the spectrum, the crime is understood to attach only to acts
that seek to weaponize the civilian suffering associated with starvation. Advocates
of this view emphasize the Rome Statute language specifying that to perpetrate
the crime is to “[i]ntentionally us[e]” the starvation of civilians as a “method of
warfare.”65 The term “method” alone suggests deliberate, purposive action; that
the method in question must be used “intentionally” only bolsters that
implication.66 As such, for civilian starvation to be used intentionally as the method
62
63

64

65
66

See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Comm’n. Hum. Rts. South Sudan, supra note 9, ¶¶ 35, 89; Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the
Comm’n. on Human Rights in South Sudan, ¶ 71, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/43/56 (Jan. 31, 2020); id.
Annex II, ¶ 44; WORLD PEACE FOUND., supra note 11, at 10 n.23.
I discuss the criminal law debates in greater detail in Tom Dannenbaum, Criminalizing Starvation in
an Age of Mass Deprivation in War, 54 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming 2022).
Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxv), 8(2)(e)(xix).
On reading purpose into “method” in the underlying IHL prohibition (replicated in this respect in
the war crime), see Phillip J. Drew, Can We Starve the Civilians?, 95 INT’L L. STUDIES 302, 314 (2019);
Sean Watts, Humanitarian Logic and the Law of Siege, 94 INT’L L. STUDIES 1, 18–19 (2019). See also U.S.
DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL §§ 5.20.1, 17.9.2.1 (rev. ed. Dec. 2016),
https://perma.cc/AC36-LQCK [hereinafter U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL]; JEAN-MARIE
HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
186 (2005) (describing rule fifty-three). On reading purpose into the use of “intentionally” (or
“intentionally” combined with “method”) in the war crime, see Randle C. DeFalco, Conceptualizing
Famine as a Subject of International Criminal Justice, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1113, 1145 (2017); GERHARD
WERLE & FLORIAN JEßBERGER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 506 (3d ed. 2014);
Daniel Frank, The Elements of War Crimes – Article 8(2)(b)(xxv), in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 203, 205 (Roy S. Lee
ed., 2001).

Winter 2022

381

Chicago Journal of International Law

by which to advance the war effort, it must be inflicted purposefully with a view
to its weaponization. Or so the thinking goes
On such an interpretation, much of the starvation of civilians in war might
appear to be beyond the scope of the criminal prohibition. Most obviously, acts
pursued with a view to weakening or weaponizing the suffering of combatants could
be argued to fall outside the scope of the crime, even when they also cause
widespread civilian deprivation, as is likely in a comprehensive starvation siege.67
As long as the “surrender or starve”68 message of the siege is directed at
combatants, the fact that civilians will also starve would not itself be sufficient for
the war crime to attach. Offering civilians safe egress might be thought to
emphasize this distinction by indicating that the starvation of those who remain
is regretted, rather than weaponized.69 Understood in that way, the ensuing civilian
suffering is analogous to the civilian loss occurring as the collateral damage of an
attack on a legitimate military objective. Although potentially subject to the IHL
rules of proportionality and precaution, this civilian suffering would not be
prohibited by the starvation rule, and it would certainly not qualify as the criminal
form of starvation of civilians.70
This argument tends to be made most forcefully in contexts of encirclement
deprivation.71 There is a doctrinal reason for this: Article 54 of Additional Protocol
I is more clearly expansive in its prohibition of the destruction, removal, or
rendering useless of indispensable objects than it is with respect to the impeding
67

68

69

70

71

See IIFFMM, Detailed Findings (2019), supra note 8 at ¶ 420; Rep. of the Comm’n of Experts
Established Pursuant to Resolution 780 (1992), transmitted by Letter dated 24 May 1994 from the
Secretary General to the President of the Security Council, Annex VI.B: The Battle of Sarajevo and
the Law of Armed Conflict, ¶ 76, U.N. Doc S/1994/674/Add.2 (vol. III) (Dec. 28, 1994)
[hereinafter UN Commission Report Sarajevo]; Watts, supra note 66, at 19.
Such tactics are sometimes referred to using the terms “kneel or starve,” “surrender or starve,” or
“surrender-or-die.” GLOB. RTS. COMPLIANCE & WORLD PEACE FOUND., THE CRIME OF
STARVATION AND METHODS OF PROSECUTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY ¶ 105 (June 13, 2019),
https://perma.cc/V353-98MH; AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 24, at 15; Brian Lander & Rebecca
Vetharaniam Richards, Addressing Hunger and Starvation in Situations of Armed Conflict, 17 J. INT’L CRIM
JUST. 675, 677 (2019).
Relatedly, see U. K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
¶¶ 5.27.1, 5.34.3 (2004), https://perma.cc/QS59-2DED [hereinafter U.K. LOAC MANUAL];
Kraska, supra note 4, ¶ 21; YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 255–56 (3d ed. 2016); Provost, supra note 40, at 618; Matthew
C. Waxman, Siegecraft and Surrender, 39 VA. J. INT’L. L. 353, 363 (1999).
Even assuming proportionality does serve as a backstop for a narrow reading of the starvation ban
in IHL, the war crime attaches only to “clearly” disproportionate attacks, and there is no NIAC war
crime of disproportionate attacks in the Rome Statute. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
Contesting the application of proportionality to siege warfare on the grounds that it applies only to
“attacks,” which are defined in Article 49 of Protocol I as “acts of violence against the adversary,
whether in offence or in defence,” (AP I, supra note 43, art. 49(1)), see Watts, supra note 66, at 19;
Drew, supra note 66, at 319–20.
See, e.g., Watts, supra note 66; Waxman, supra note 69; Drew, supra note 66.
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of such objects’ delivery to an encircled area.72 However, the focus on
encirclement deprivation in arguments seeking to limit the scope of the starvation
ban also reflects a normative determination that sieges involve a particularly acute
military imperative to engage in comprehensive and indiscriminate starvation.
This necessity claim is central to the question of how to think about the normative
underpinnings of the crime. It is addressed in the next Section.
Focusing on the text of the criminal prohibition, others are not persuaded
by the purposive characterization of what is proscribed. For them, “method of
warfare” has no settled definition in IHL,73 and is understood most plausibly to
do “no more than describe conduct that is part of hostilities.”74 Moreover, the
specification that starvation of civilians be used “intentionally” ought to be
understood in accordance with the default mens rea standards in Article 30 of the
Rome Statute,75 which specify that a person should be understood to have “intent”
with respect to a criminal consequence when that “person means to cause that
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.”76 The
threshold for the latter (oblique) form of intent has been defined in ICC
jurisprudence as being satisfied when the perpetrator acted with a “virtual
certainty” that the result would occur.77 Using starvation methods on an encircled
population with a view to starving out combatants could meet this threshold,
72

73

74

75

76
77

See JACOB TURKEL ET AL., THE PUBLIC COMMISSION TO EXAMINE THE MARITIME INCIDENT OF 31
MAY 2010 ¶ 78 (2011),
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/downloads_eng1/en/ENG_turkel_eng_a.pdf (last
visited Jan. 23, 2022) [hereinafter the Turkel Commission Report]; Drew, supra note 66, at 314.
The Commentary to Protocol I provides only, “[t]he term ‘means of combat’ or ‘means of
warfare’ . . . generally refers to the weapons being used, while the expression ‘methods of combat’
generally refers to the way in which such weapons are used.” COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 ¶ 1957 (Yves
Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987). Although comprehensible in
framing what differentiates means from methods, this is plainly not a viable definition of the term.
The Protocol itself identifies methods of warfare that involve no direct use of weapons. Gloria
Gaggioli & Nils Melzer, Methods of Warfare, in OXFORD GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 235 (Dapo Akande & Ben Saul eds., 2020).
Wayne Jordash, Catriona Murdoch & Joe Holmes, Strategies for Prosecuting Mass Starvation, 17 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 849, 862 (2019); GLOB. RTS. COMPLIANCE & WORLD PEACE FOUND., supra note 68,
¶ 78.
D’Alessandra & Gillett, supra note 18, at 841; Jordash, Murdoch, & Holmes, supra note 74, at 854,
858–60. More equivocally, Cottier and Richard argue that the relevant language is designed to
exclude “starvation as a result of unintended mismanagement,” Cottier & Richard, supra note 50, at
518, and suggest, in line with oblique intent, that “if the outcome of impeding humanitarian
assistance is obvious according to the ordinary course of events, the intention can be inferred.” Id.
at 519. See also the equivocation in Manuel J. Ventura, Prosecuting Starvation under International Criminal
Law: Exploring the Legal Possibilities, 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 781, 785–88 (2019).
Rome Statute, supra note 1, article 30(2)(b) [emphasis added].
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-3121, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 447–50 (Dec. 1,
2014), https://perma.cc/22B2-XCZP.
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because such a technique would entail knowingly starving civilians, even assuming
no desire to weaponize their suffering. Although Article 30 does not apply
technically to the use of “intentionally” in the starvation provisions, the latter can
be read in its light.78
A further line of argument in favor of a broad prohibition focuses on the
meaning of “starvation of civilians as a method of warfare.”79 The central objective
element of the ICC crime is that civilians are deprived of objects indispensable to
their survival, not that they die or suffer any particular harm as a result.80
Moreover, paragraphs 2–3 of Article 54 of Protocol I (the IHL rule underpinning
the war crime) proscribe both engaging in such deprivation actions with a view to
denying sustenance to the adverse party (as long as civilians will also be affected) and
engaging in such deprivation actions for any other reasons when doing so would
cause civilian starvation or force civilians to move.81
Understanding the war crime in that context, “intentionally using starvation
of civilians as a method of warfare” can be read transitively82 to refer to the
practice of denying civilians sustenance, rather than that of seeking to weaponize
the harm they suffer as a result. On this reading, the crime would include the
actions of belligerents who engage deliberately in the deprivation of objects
indispensable to civilian survival even if they do so without the goal of harming
civilians.
In fact, recognizing the starvation method to inhere in the act of deprivation,
rather than the weaponization of suffering, has implications even assuming that
civilians must be targeted with deprivation for the crime to attach. A civilian
population does not lose its civilian character due to the presence of combatants
within it.83 When belligerents deprive an encircled population of essentials in order
to starve out the combatants ensconced within, they target the civilian population
with deprivation as a necessary predicate to starving those enemy fighters.
Similarly, operations targeted at civilians and combatants without discrimination

82

Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13-2275-Red, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 677 (Mar. 8,
2018), https://perma.cc/8846-552S; Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-424,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges at ¶¶ 194–95 (June 15, 2009), https://perma.cc/8S279UER; Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 2706, 2865–74
(Feb. 4, 2021), https://perma.cc/58EV-2RW3. WERLE & JEßBERGER, supra note 66, at 352, 365,
387.
Dannenbaum, supra note 64.
See Int’l Crim. Ct., Elements of Crimes, Doc. No. ICC-PIDS-LT-03-002/11_Eng, at 31 (2011)
[hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes].
See AP I, supra note 43, art. 54(2–3).
Dannenbaum, supra note 64.

83

See supra notes 220–21 and accompanying text.

78

79
80

81
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have been understood to be operations targeted at civilians at the same time as
they are operations targeted at combatants. 84
There is much more to be said doctrinally on both sides of this interpretive
debate.85 However, the elements above identify some of the key points of
disagreement. The implications are significant. On the narrow view of the
prohibition, it would be rare for a siege to meet the threshold for starvation of
civilians as a method of warfare. On the broader interpretation, a siege that
involved depriving the encircled population of essential goods would almost
certainly satisfy the threshold, unless the population were composed
predominantly of combatants or persons directly participating in hostilities. It is
not the project of this Article to resolve that doctrinal dispute. However, the
debate spotlights a more fundamental tension regarding how to understand the
moral stakes of the prohibition.

III. N E C E SSITY AND N ORMATIVITY : F RAMING THE
A RGU ME NT
The central normative claim underpinning objections to a broad and
categorical prohibition of encirclement deprivation is that such a rule is
insufficiently attentive to the military imperatives that motivate siege warfare. The
thesis arising from this argument can take one of two forms. One is internal to
the law. In that line of thought, military necessity is invoked as an underlying
principle of IHL that demands a narrow interpretation of the rules codified in the
Protocols, of their customary analogues, and therefore of the derivative war crime
provisions in the Rome Statute and elsewhere. On this view, existing law should
be interpreted to minimize the constraints on encirclement starvation. A second
approach critiques the law from the external point of view. From that perspective,
the current legal rule is correctly interpreted as broadly prohibitive of encirclement
deprivation, but states would do well to refrain from ratifying treaties that include
the rule and to resist its customary crystallization on the grounds that the rule
ignores relevant military imperatives.
The important point at this stage is that these divergent perspectives on the
law as it stands share a common normative posture. After detailing that shared
underpinning, this Section contends that neither of these positions can be
evaluated without reference to the countervailing moral interest at stake in the
starvation ban. It is only through identifying the pro tanto wrong associated with
starvation methods that we can begin to think through whether and when
necessity might justify them.

84

See supra note 219 and accompanying text.

85

See Dannenbaum, supra note 64.
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A. The Purported Necessity of Comprehensive Encirclement
Starvation
The empirical claim underpinning each of the necessity arguments is simple.
Facing a populated and well-defended locality, the imposition of comprehensive
restrictions on what goes in is often deemed the most promising route by which
a belligerent might take that locality and defeat the forces that hold it. Most
obviously, that method allows the besieging force to coerce capitulation, rather
than engaging in the significantly more militarily demanding alternative of trying
to take the area by assault.86 Even when some form of assault is required, the siege
can be expected to weaken the enemy sufficiently to reduce the difficulty of such
an operation. Thus, despite decrying the “surrender or starve” tactics of siege
warfare as “disastrous for civilians,” the U.N. Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on Syria recognized the method as having been
“successful for overtaking opposition-held territory” in the conflict.87 In the naval
context, Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg asserts, “blockade remains a most efficient
method for subduing the enemy.”88
Crucially, on at least some accounts, the efficacy of this method is contingent
on the total isolation of the besieged force.89 From that perspective, if a siege is to
work, those within the encircled locality must be cut off completely.90 Anything
short of comprehensive sequestration, including from humanitarian aid and other
essentials, would give the adversary the lifeline necessary to sustain its defensive
posture, potentially extending the siege indefinitely and precluding a decisive
victory.91 And it is in that respect that the starvation of civilians comes into the
picture. Ordinarily, the very fact of encirclement indicates that the besieging party
lacks granular control over what happens within the encircled area.92 As such, it is
impossible for that party to determine in advance whether food or other essential
consignments allowed through would sustain civilians, enemy combatants, or
86

87

88
89
90
91
92

See, e.g., Françoise Hampson, A Terminological Issue: What is a Siege?, 46 COLLEGIUM 91, 93 (2016) (“It
is generally admitted that the ratio is between three and five attacking forces to one defending force
in order to take a town by assault, whereas in the case of a siege, the ratio is said to be one to one.”).
See also Beehner, Berti, & Jackson, supra note 26, at 81; Fox, supra note 26, at 4.
Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Independent Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/64 ¶ 95 (Feb. 2, 2017) [hereinafter Independent Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry
on Syria Rep.].
Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 4, ¶ 27.
See Watts, supra note 66, at 48.
See id.
See id.; Sean Watts, Siege in Contemporary Doctrine: How Does it Work?, 46 COLLEGIUM 95, 96 (2016).
There are rare containment encirclements where the blockading state has the capacity to enter and
control the territory but chooses instead to control the perimeter. The Israeli blockade of Gaza
arguably falls into this category. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION 276–85 (2009).
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both.93 Therefore, if the enemy forces must be isolated for the method to work,
so too must be the civilian population within which they are ensconced.
From the method’s efficacy, it is claimed, follows a military imperative.
“Very often,” Sean Watts argues, “you do not have a choice, you do not have the
forces you need to undertake an assault of a city, or the weapon system that you
would need to overcome the defenders.”94 Cutting them off and weakening them
to the point of capitulation or maximal vulnerability would seem to offer the most
(and possibly the only) viable path forward.
The thesis that much encirclement deprivation either is or ought to be
permissible is built on this empirical premise. Responding to those who might
question why civilian deaths can be inflicted by encirclement in ways that would
be prohibited if they were achieved by kinetic attack, Michael Walzer reasons,
“[t]he obvious answer is simply that the capture of cities is often an important
military objective . . . and frontal assault failing, the siege is the only remaining
means to success.”95
As indicated above, some take the necessity of encirclement deprivation in
such contexts to expose a serious flaw in the law’s categorical prohibition on
starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. Along these lines, Yoram Dinstein
has condemned Article 54 of Protocol I, describing its posture on siege warfare
as “untenable in practice” because it blocks a viable path to military success, when
“no other method of warfare has been devised to bring about the capture of a
defended town.”96 That untenability might be invoked as a reason for declining to

93

See U.N. Comm’n. Rep. Sarajevo, supra note 67, ¶¶ 76, 87; Provost, supra note 40, at 617; Françoise
Hampson, The Prohibition of Starvation: Additional Elements? 46 COLLEGIUM 99, 99 (2016); Watts, supra
note 66, at 19.
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Watts, supra note 91, at 95.
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 162 (1977).
Yoram Dinstein, Siege Warfare and the Starvation of Civilians, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD 145, 151 (A.M. Delissen et al. eds., 1991). See also DINSTEIN, supra
note 69, at 253–57; Kraska, supra note 4, ¶¶ 10, 21; William J. Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian
as a Punishable Offense, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 539, 557 (1997). Although Watts later builds on
this to argue for a narrow interpretation of the law, some of his earlier work adopts a posture not
unlike Dinstein’s. See Watts, supra note 91, at 98; Sean Watts, Some Comments About the United Nations
Security Council Resolution 2139 (2014), 46 COLLEGIUM 104, 105 (2016).
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ratify the relevant treaties,97 ratifying with a reservation,98 or resisting claims that
the rule has gained customary status.99
For others, the existing rules are more open to interpretation than Dinstein
allows. From that perspective, military necessity demands a narrow interpretation
of the legal prohibitions, particularly in the context of encirclement warfare. Thus,
Watts decries “operationally troubling”100 efforts to require besieging parties to
permit the passage of humanitarian relief to avert civilian starvation, describing
that understanding of existing law as driven by a myopic “resort to humanitarian
objects or purposes, without equal attention to military necessity.”101 For him,
such interpretations fail to take seriously the possibility that “permissive rules for
withholding consent to relief actions reflect not inadequacies but rather the
presently-operative balance between humanity and military necessity.”102
Similarly, Matthew Waxman centers military necessity as the foundation of
what he believes to be the law’s permissive posture on the issue, arguing:
siege methods have long been given leniency in customary law because they
were seen as the only viable means of securing certain military objectives. . . .
[Therefore,] [t]he international community expressed a reluctance, even
among the strongest condemners of Serb practices [in the sieges of Sarajevo
and Srebrenica in the 1990s], to accept the wholesale rejection of siege as a
legitimate instrument.103

Along the same lines, Françoise Hampson contends, “[i]f well-meaning
humanitarians argue that the applicable rules mean that you cannot conduct sieges
lawfully, that does not mean that sieges will not happen. Rather, it means that
sieges will happen unlawfully or outside the framework of law.”104 The upshot, in
her view, is simple: “sieges are occasionally necessary, and being necessary, it is up

103

Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Review of the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, to Secretary of Defense, at 72–73 (May 3, 1985),
https://perma.cc/T2HL-PTS3 (Article 70 of Protocol I, which supplements Article 54 by
emphasizing the need for humanitarian access in cases of inadequate supply, was deemed acceptable
only subject to the caveat that humanitarian access could be denied on the grounds of “imperative
considerations of military necessity,” to preclude a “radical, if perhaps unintended, change in the
customary law of siege and blockade warfare, which has always allowed the besieging and
blockading power to cut off all supplies going to areas of enemy control.”).
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Reservation / Declaration (U.K., ¶ (p)),
https://perma.cc/67W4-QMVP; Id. (Fr., ¶ 17), https://perma.cc/QUD9-MH2C.
Questioning whether “all of [the] particulars” of Article 54 are customary, even as it accepts the
customary status of the core ban. U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 66, § 5.20.4.
Watts, supra note 66, at 6.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 48.
Waxman, supra note 69, at 421.
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Hampson, supra note 86, at 92.
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to the law to accommodate them.”105 Thus, in evaluating the siege of Sarajevo, a
U.N. Commission of Experts found itself “faced with the unpalatable fact that,
unless there is a neutral arbiter, the only way to starve-out a besieged military force,
a legitimate act of war, is to starve the civilian population.”106 Given that “the
intermingling of military forces and the civilian population” precluded
discriminating in the deprivation methods, the Commission found the criminality
of the siege of Sarajevo to be “debatable.”107

B. A Valid Empirical Premise?
One line of response to such arguments is to challenge the claim that
starvation methods are necessary to overcome well-defended and populated areas.
Along these lines, one might question the binary framing according to which the
only paths forward are all-out military assault or comprehensive encirclement
starvation.108 A siege or blockade that interdicts contraband109 but preserves an
effective channel for the supply of goods essential to human survival110 can be an
effective way to contain enemy forces within the encircled area, to undermine their
capacity to launch an offensive from that location, and to preclude their
deployment elsewhere.111 Under the right circumstances, this can be combined
with targeted attacks on specific military objectives to degrade the contained force.
On this view, one can affirm the utility of a form of siege warfare, and yet insist
that “[s]ieges must still allow for vital foodstuffs and other essential supplies to be
delivered to the civilian population.”112

105
106
107

108

109

110

111

112

Id.
U.N. Comm’n Rep. Sarajevo, supra note 67, ¶ 76.
Letter dated 24 May 1994 from the Secretary General to the President of the Security Council, ¶ 204
U.N. Doc S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994).
KJ Riordan, Shelling, Sniping and Starvation, 41 VICTORIA UNIV. WELLINGTON L. REV. 149, 178
(2010).
Consider the Turkel Commission’s framing of an Israeli policy change in 2010. Turkel Commission
Report, supra note 72, ¶ 97 (“[I]t should be noted that in June 2010, the Israeli Government changed
the land border crossings policy from a policy in which only the transfer of limited humanitarian
supplies was allowed to a policy where only the entry of goods that have military purposes is
prohibited.”). On the legality of interdicting contraband in the absence of a viable comprehensive
blockade, see Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 4, ¶ 2; DANIEL P. O’CONNELL, 2 THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 1150 (1984).
This was how the Israeli High Court of Justice evaluated the situation in Gaza in 2008. HCJ 9132/07
Al-Bassiouni Ahmed v. Prime Minister of Israel, ¶ 22 (2008) (Isr.), unofficial translation available at
https://perma.cc/CBC6-7TJ9. See also Turkel Commission Report, supra note 72, ¶¶ 73, 76.
See EMANUELA-CHIARA GILLARD, SIEGES, THE LAW, AND PROTECTING CIVILIANS 2 (2019);
Beehner, Berti & Jackson, supra note 26, at 80–81.
Sec. Council, The International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African Republic, Final
Report, U.N. Doc. S/2014/928 (Dec. 22, 2014), ¶ 233. See also supra note 110.
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Challenging the premise from a different angle, it has been argued that
subjecting a heavily populated area to encirclement starvation often fails to
precipitate capitulation, serving instead simply to strengthen the hand of the
besieged force vis-à-vis the severely impacted civilian population.113 Additionally,
it might be argued that when sieges do succeed in dislodging the adversary, this is
because the process of encirclement deprivation is supplemented with the use of
“overwhelming” or “indiscriminate” force.114
Objections along these lines go to the empirical keystone of the necessity
argument. If alternative (and less destructive) methods are available, it would be
misleading to characterize comprehensive siege starvation as militarily essential.
Conversely, if encirclement deprivation is largely ineffective or counterproductive,
the necessity claim is simply untenable. And if the method works only in contexts
in which it is combined with actions that either render it superfluous or implicate
the besieging party in clear war crimes, its potential efficacy is not justificatory.
However, resolving the question of the efficacy of siege warfare is not the
project of this Article. For even assuming encirclement starvation can be effective,
it does not follow that it must be permissible as a matter of legal interpretation or
that it should be permissible as a matter of lex ferenda. The normative relevance of
military necessity depends on a theory of the pro tanto wrong associated with the
starvation of civilians. It depends, in other words, on a normative account of the
crime.

C. Necessity, Humanity, and Categorical Prohibitions
Contemporary IHL and the associated war crimes regime have at their core
a series of categorical prohibitions that hold irrespective of the potential military
advantage associated with their violation. In contrast to the authorizing role of the
necessity concept in earlier iterations of the regime,115 “the idea today that military
necessity may justify deviation from the LOAC [law of armed conflict] cannot be
taken as a serious argument.”116

113

114

115
116

See Mark Lattimer, Can Incidental Starvation of Civilians be Lawful under IHL?, EJIL:TALK! (Mar. 26,
2019), https://perma.cc/25HL-JHRL; Provost, supra note 40, at 620; Allen, supra note 4, at 82.
Beehner, Berti & Jackson, supra note 26, at 80, 82 (examining examples, see 80–85). See Watts, supra
note 66, at 16.
See, e.g., JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE 4, 183 (2012).
Robert Lawless, Practical and Conceptual Challenges to Doctrinal Military Necessity, in NECESSITY AND
PROPORTIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY LAW 285, 318 (Claus Kreß & Robert
Lawless eds., 2020); id. at 314 (“states universally condition the broad language they use to define
military necessity on compliance with other rules contained within the LOAC”); United States v. List
(Feb. 19, 1948), in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 1230, 1253-56 (1950); DINSTEIN, supra note 69, at 10–12;
U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 66, § 2.2.2.1.
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This is a legal reality with significant operational implications. Under the
right conditions, one party to a conflict may stand to gain militarily by attacking
the enemy’s civilian population to coerce their political leaders into withdrawal or
capitulation.117 In some cases, doing so may be the only plausible route to
achieving their ultimate objectives in the conflict. And yet, from the legal point of
view, this imperative is irrelevant. The targeting of civilians who are not
participating directly in hostilities is categorically prohibited and criminal,
irrespective of military necessity.118 The arguments offered in defense of Allied
“terror bombing” in World War II are simply unavailable within the normative
framework enshrined in law today.119 Similarly, belligerents may not employ
weapons that cannot be directed at a specific military objective, even if those are
the most militarily effective weapons available to them in a context of urban
warfare.120 Those who use such weapons in that context engage in war crimes.121
The insufficiency of military necessity as the basis for legal permission is
equally clear in the context of capture and detention. It is straightforwardly
unlawful and criminal to kill enemy belligerents who have been captured and
therefore rendered hors de combat, even if their capture occurs behind enemy lines
and taking the prisoners in tow would thwart the mission of the capturing force.122
In such contexts, the capturing party must either release or detain, regardless of
whether such options would be compatible with the goals of its operation. 123
Similarly, if a detaining authority is unable to provide prisoners of war with
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See ROBERT PAPE, DYING TO WIN 27–37, 79–101 6 (2005). Efficacy here is highly contextual. See
e.g., Tom Dannenbaum, Bombs, Ballots, and Coercion, 20 SEC. STUD. 303 (2011).
See AP I, supra note 44, art. 51(2); Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 8(2)(b)(i), 8(2)(c)(i), 8(2)(e)(i);
Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 129–30 (Nov. 30, 2006);
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment at ¶ 109 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July 29, 2004).
Cf. WALZER, supra note 95, ch. 16 (evaluating justifications offered for the “terror bombing” of
German and Japanese cities, rejecting many, but providing narrow support for the use of the
method in extreme emergency, such as the imminent risk of comprehensive and devastating Nazi
victory).
See 2 INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN GEORGIA
338–43 (2009), https://perma.cc/VTQ9-5MRL; Kraska, supra note 4, ¶ 13; Hum. Rts. Council,
Rep. of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict, ¶¶ 31, 33, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/29/52 (2015).
See Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 461–63, 472 (June 12, 2007);
Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 247–52 (Oct. 8, 2008).
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(vi); AP I, supra note 44, arts. 41, 85(3)(e); Hague
Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, annex, art. 23(c),
36 Stat. 2277; Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law,
50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 805 (2010).
See Schmitt, supra note 122, at 805.
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adequate nutrition and is unable to ensure that standard via other means (such as
external assistance), it must release and repatriate the affected prisoners.124
More prominently, and as discussed in greater detail below, efforts to justify
torture on necessity grounds have, with rare and highly controversial exceptions,
failed to gain legal acceptance.125 The rejection of pro-torture arguments has not
relied exclusively on the empirical counterpoint that the practice is ineffective as
a method of eliciting information.126 On the contrary, it has been maintained even
in contexts in which efficacy is assumed. In that vein, Judge Aharon Barak wrote
on behalf of the Israeli Supreme Court that a law-abiding state (or, in his framing,
a democracy) “must sometimes fight with one hand tied behind its back.”127
Although the decision in which that claim is embedded has been critiqued
persuasively as having the practical effect of legitimating, rather than constraining,
detainee mistreatment,128 Barak was correct that compliance with the law of armed
conflict does not guarantee the availability of all militarily advantageous methods.
Just as the military utility of a particular method is insufficient to justify
deviation from a clear legal prohibition, that utility cannot be invoked in isolation
to resolve ambiguities within the law of armed conflict. The status of military
necessity as an underlying normative principle of the regime is itself contested.129
Moreover, even those who assume that military necessity does indeed perform
such a function accept that it operates in productive tension with the
often-countervailing principle of humanity.130 Identifying that tension as the
normative underpinning of the regime precludes the unchecked interpretive
dominance of the former no less than it precludes the unchecked interpretive
dominance of the latter. 131 Thus, even for those who assume that the law of armed
conflict is best understood as seeking to accommodate “states’ interest in pursuing
the object of war,” it is crucial “to avoid the misunderstanding that the LOAC
124

See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION ¶ 2119
(2021).

125

See infra Section V.A.
For evidence of the inefficacy of torture, see generally SHANE O’MARA, WHY TORTURE DOESN’T
WORK: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF INTERROGATION (2015).
HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel, 53(4) PD 3, 36–37 (1999).
See, e.g., Itamar Mann & Omer Shatz, The Necessity Procedure: Laws of Torture in Israel and Beyond, 1987–
2009, 6 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT (2010). That critique has now been confirmed, as the
Supreme Court seems to have untied the government’s hand completely. See generally HCJ 9018/17
Tbeish & Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Attorney General (2018) (Isr.), unofficial translation
of the verdict available at https://perma.cc/38RM-U747.
See ADIL HAQUE, LAW AND MORALITY AT WAR 32–34 (2017).
See generally Schmitt, supra note 122.
See David Luban, Military Necessity and the Cultures of Military Law, 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 315, 339
(2013) (on the best understanding of IHL today, “civilian interests matter as much as military
interests.”). But see generally Watts, supra note 66 (condemning the invocation of humanity at the
expense of necessity).

126

127
128

129
130
131

392

Vol. 22 No. 2

Siege Starvation

Dannenbaum

generally, and military necessity in particular, justifies the unencumbered pursuit
of war aims.”132
Waxman acknowledges that arguments for the permissibility of siege
starvation are rooted fundamentally in “similar reasons” to those underpinning
purported justifications of indiscriminate bombing in World War II and the
Vietnam War.133 This is telling. Indiscriminate attacks and attacks on civilian
populations have been prohibited despite their potential military utility.134
Analogously, it is entirely possible that “[t]o the extent the rules [on starvation and
humanitarian access] complicate the conduct of military operations, such
complication is amply warranted by the crucial concerns of humanity served by
provision of relief to civilian populations in need.”135 Whether that impediment to
military efficacy is indeed warranted on those grounds depends in significant part
on what is morally at stake in the starvation of civilians.
Ultimately, whatever one’s view on the general theory that IHL represents a
balance between the imperatives of necessity and humanity, the categorical nature
of at least some of the IHL prohibitions discussed above reflects a determination
that the associated moral imperatives hold even in the face of significant military
or other utility. International human rights law accepts the limitation of rights in
pursuit of certain “legitimate aims” only as long as that limitation does not put the
right itself in jeopardy.136 Along similar lines, IHL’s categorical proscriptions might
be understood as efforts to protect core rights that cannot be sacrificed or
jeopardized, even in the service of a war effort. Certainly, the absolute prohibitions
on torturing or executing detainees may appropriately be understood in these
terms.137 Determining whether something similar might be true of starvation as a
method of warfare requires getting to grips with the normative underpinnings of
the prohibition.138 It requires asking what, precisely, is criminally wrongful about
engaging in the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare.
132
133

134

135
136

137
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Lawless, supra note 116, at 312.
Waxman, supra note 69, at 407. See also Watts, supra note 66, at 16 (integrating an analysis of the
efficacy of encirclement deprivation and of indiscriminate bombardment).
See AP I, supra note 44, at arts. 51(2), 51(5)(a); Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 8(2)(b)(i), 8(2)(e)(i).
See also supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text.
Allen, supra note 4, at 83.
See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment 34, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12,
2011); Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment 10: Freedom of Expression (Art. 19), ¶ 4 (June 29,
1983).
See Gäfgen v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. [GC], App. No. 22978/05, ¶ 107 (June 1, 2010). See also infra
Section V.
Emphasizing the importance of engaging in such inquiry, Naz Modirzadeh argues, “The hard part
in our field is not the technical law math. The hard part is the morality, ethics, and the stakes of
decision making. How to talk about those in a legal language, and how to actually say thoughtful or
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D. The Normative Posture of Internationa l Criminal Law
To ask what is criminally wrongful about a particular violation is to take
seriously the notion that designating that violation a war crime entails a moral
claim about the wrongfulness of the underlying conduct.139 Arguably, this idea
underpins criminal law generally. As Anthony Duff puts it:
What is distinctive about criminal law is that it inflicts not just penalties, but
punishments—impositions that convey a message of censure or
condemnation; the convictions that precede punishment are not mere neutral
findings of fact, that this defendant breached this legal rule, but normative
judgments that this defendant committed a culpable wrong. 140

It is now widely asserted that one of international criminal law’s core
functions is to give voice to certain moral values and condemn their violation. 141
That function is manifest most clearly in the punishment of those who commit
war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide while acting in their home
territory, pursuant to clear domestic legal authorization (and even obligation),

critical or constructive things about those questions. That is the hard part.” Naz Modirzadeh, Cut
These Words: Passion and International Law of War Scholarship, 61 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 58–59 (2020). For
Modirzadeh, contemporary scholars could learn from those who wrote on IHL during the Vietnam
War, many of whom were driven to connect their legal analysis to their understanding of the moral
purpose of the rules and the regime as a whole. Id.
139

140

141

On the relationship between war crimes law and just war theory, see Tom Dannenbaum, War Crimes
and Just War Theory, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF APPLIED ETHICS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
775 (Kimberly Kessler Ferzan & Larry Alexander eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2019). On the
relationship between just war theory and the underlying law of armed conflict, see HAQUE, supra
note 129.
R.A. Duff, Towards a Modest Legal Moralism, 8 Crim. L. & Phil. 217, 219–20 (2014). See also R.A.
DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS, 81–82 (1986); ANDREW SIMESTER & ANDREAS VON HIRSCH,
CRIMES, HARMS, AND WRONGS: ON THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINALISATION 19 (2011); John Kleinig,
The Hardness of Hard Treatment, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY 273 (Andrew Ashworth
ed., 1998); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 599 (1996);
VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 91
(2011); On expressivism at the domestic level, see Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes,
Expressive Theories of Law, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of
Punishment, 49 MONIST 397 (1965).
See, e.g., MARK DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 12, 61, 173–79
(2007); David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal
Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 575–76 (Samantha Besson & John
Tasioulas eds., 2010); Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment, 43 STAN.
J. INT’L L. 39 (2007); Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, 2 INT’L CRIM.
L. REV. 93, 117 (2002); Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265 (2012);
Ralph Henham, Some Issues for Sentencing in the International Criminal Court, 52 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 81,
111 (2003); Bill Wringe, Why Punish War Crimes?, 25 NO. 2 L. & PHIL. 151 (2006). For a
comprehensive overview of expressivism in international criminal law, see CARSTEN STAHN,
JUSTICE AS A MESSAGE: EXPRESSIVIST FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL CIVIL JUSTICE (2020).
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against their co-citizens.142 Overriding the primary coordinative legal framework
(domestic law) in a context in which there is no need to coordinate between that
framework and another framework with equal sovereign authority cannot be
understood with reference to the coordinating function of law. International
criminal law’s requirement that any perpetrator who has a “moral choice” is
dutybound to disobey such domestic laws manifests a substantive view about right
and wrong.143
The institutional agents of international criminal law have long been
conscious of its normative posture. In his opening statement before the first major
international criminal tribunal, chief American prosecutor at Nuremberg Robert
Jackson argued, “When I say that we do not ask for convictions unless we prove
crime, I do not mean mere technical or incidental transgression of international
conventions. We charge guilt on planned and intended conduct that involves
moral as well as legal wrong.”144 Decades later, amidst the revival of international
criminal law, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
emphasized its role in issuing “public reprobation” through punishment.145 The
ICC has described its sentencing of convicted perpetrators as “an expression of
the international community’s condemnation”146 and refers frequently to
perpetrators’ “moral blameworthiness”147 and “cruelty” in sentencing.148
To recognize the moral expression inherent in international criminalization
and punishment is not to deny the ways in which political factors shape the
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See, e.g., United States v. Göring (Oct. 1, 1946), Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, in 22
TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 411, 466,
(1948) [hereinafter Göring]; United States v. Alstötter, 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
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25 (2018).
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NO. 10 411, 470–88 (1949).
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See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04–01/07, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of
the Statute, ¶¶ 49, 69–71, 143 (May 23, 2014), https://perma.cc/EYF4-2F9D.
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articulation of the expressivist mission and the way it is pursued.149
Notwithstanding Jackson’s lofty rhetoric, the tribunal before which he delivered
that speech was normatively defective because it lacked the jurisdiction to examine
crimes committed by the Allies.150 Although the tribunals that have been created
since have not been quite as explicit in their selectivity or partiality, power remains
a crucial factor in the distribution of criminal justice, and victors’ justice critiques
(or close equivalents) endure.151
That political context raises real challenges for the legitimacy of the
application of international criminal law. However, it does not contradict the fact
of a moral assertion at the heart of the regime. On the contrary, that
condemnation is central to what stakeholders seek to control and harness to their
political ends.152 Moreover, critiques that point to the specific political conditions
of any given court’s activity as precluding the moral standing necessary for
defensible condemnation are meaningful precisely because condemning is what
such institutions do.153

E. Precision in Specifying the Mea ning of a Crime
If punishment amounts to a particular form of moral expression, it is
important to all stakeholders that the message inherent in any given criminal
prohibition can be identified. Accused persons face the prospect of being followed
by the “symbolic and condemnatory” implications of the specific crimes of which
they are convicted.154 Conversely, the law’s capacity to express solidarity with
victims is contingent on the relevant criminal categories capturing the wrong they
149

150

151

152
153

154

See Barrie Sander, The Expressive Turn of International Criminal Justice: A Field in Search of Meaning, 32
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 851, 862–66 (2019).
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 82 U.N.T.S 279, arts 1, 6 (Aug. 8, 1945). On the
critique, see, for example, William A. Schabas, Victor’s Justice: Selecting Situations at the International
Criminal Court, 43 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 535, 536 (2010). This point was made most pointedly
in the dissenting opinion of Radhabinod Pal in the similarly restricted tribunal established in Tokyo
for the trial of defeated Japanese war criminals. Judgment of the Honorable Mr. Justice Pal, Member
from India, DOCUMENTS ON THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 809, 826–27 (Neil
Boister & Robert Cryer eds., 2008); Charter of the International Tribunal for the Far East (Jan. 19,
1946) 1589 T.I.A.S. 20, arts 1, 5.
See, e.g., Letter from Philip Roth, Human Rights Watch to ICTR Chief Prosecutor Hassan Jallow in
Response to His Letter on the Prosecution of RPF Crimes, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 14, 2009),
https://perma.cc/8QS8-LF5V; Withdrawal Strategy Document, African Union Doc.
EX.CL/1006(XXX) (Jan. 2017); Asad G. Kiyani, Third World Approaches to International Criminal Law,
109 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 255 (2016).
See Sander, supra note 149, at 867.
See Tom Dannenbaum, Legitimacy in War and Punishment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 129, 134–36 (Kevin Jon Heller et al. eds., 2020).
Matthew Gibson, Deceptive Sexual Relations, 40 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDS. 82, 106 (2020); see also James
Chalmers & Fiona Leverick, Fair Labelling in Criminal Law, 71 MODERN L. REV. 217, 231–34, 246
(2008).
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suffered in a morally intelligible way. 155 Meaning matters also to the broader
communities affected or implicated and to legal and institutional actors seeking to
operate consistently within the system.156
It is in this context that the “fair labeling” principle—the requirement that
“widely felt distinctions between kinds of offences and degrees of wrongdoing are
respected and signalled by the law”157—is gaining purchase as a human rights
imperative.158 It is connected through the principle of legality to the idea of “fair
warning,” pursuant to which “citizens should be advised [in advance] as to how
their conduct will be censured.”159 It must be possible for those to whom, and on
behalf of whom, the law speaks to “discern the criminal law’s designation of [the]
wrong [associated with each crime] as distinct and deserving of its own
condemnation.”160
If anything, the stakes associated with this principle are magnified in
international criminal law, where verdicts are of profound political significance to
large constituencies, and the crimes are thought to carry an elevated stigma. 161
Mirjan Damaška emphasizes the importance of ensuring that distinctions in this
domain rest not on legal technicality, but on “moral distinctions shared by
ordinary people.”162
The significance of moral meaning in international criminal law is
exemplified by the intensity of feeling regarding whether acts that clearly qualify
as crimes against humanity also constitute genocide.163 This distinction was central
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HIRSCH, supra note 140, at 19; Victor Tadros, Responses, 32 L. & PHIL. 241, 248 (2013); Glanville
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Id. at 107 (emphasis omitted). See also Tadros, supra note 157, at 248.
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COURT 164 (2014).
Mirjan Damaška, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 329, 353
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to the public discourse around several International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) judgments on the status of persecutory violence at
Srebrenica (where genocide was affirmed) and in other Bosnian municipalities
(where it was not). 164 The issue provoked a diplomatic fracas at the Security
Council over a symbolic resolution commemorating the Srebrenica genocide. 165
The genocidal status of clear crimes against humanity has also been a point of
debate with respect to the Khmer Rouge atrocities prosecuted before the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.166
In none of those instances was criminal liability for the impugned acts
ultimately at stake—the crimes against humanity convictions were straightforward
and often overdetermined.167 Equally, the different possible verdict combinations
portended no formal penalty differential,168 and the sentences, in at least some of
the cases, were anyway fairly certain to be longer than the defendants’ remaining
life expectancy.169 At stake was simply whether the court would identify the attacks
as distinctively genocidal in their wrongfulness. Even when a de facto life sentence
is guaranteed, the question of expressive classification remains of enormous
importance to stakeholders across the spectrum.
Genocide’s unique status in the popular imagination is such that debates as
to its applicability tend to take on a heightened public profile.170 But other
examples pervade the practice of international criminal law, including on issues
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See Radovan Karadžić, for example, was 73 when his sentence was extended from forty years to life
on the basis that others responsible for the same crimes (both those convicted of genocide and
those not convicted of genocide) were sentenced to life. Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. MICT13-55-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 761–76 (Int’l. Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Mar. 20, 2019).
See Luban, supra note 163.

398

Vol. 22 No. 2

Siege Starvation

Dannenbaum

such as modes of liability.171 In the area of gender-based and sexual violence, the
codification of crimes has developed over time to encompass a broad range of
specific offenses, including not only outrages upon personal dignity and rape, but
also sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and enforced
sterilization.172 In the first international conviction for the crime against humanity
of forced pregnancy, the ICC acknowledged the position of some states in drafting
negotiations that “the crime was unnecessary because its elements were already
covered by the crimes of rape and unlawful detention in the Statute.”173 However,
the Chamber reasoned, “As with any crime, forced pregnancy must be interpreted
in a manner which gives this crime independent meaning from the other sexual
and gender based violence crimes in the Statute.” 174 This, the judges held,
“implicates the principle of fair labelling, and how the proper characterisation of
the evil committed, that is to say, calling the crime by its true name, is part of the
justice sought by the victims. It is not enough to punish it merely as a combination
of other crimes.” 175
For similar reasons, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), and the ICC have
reached beyond the offenses codified explicitly within their statutes to articulate
and distinguish under the category of “other inhumane acts” the crime against
humanity of forced marriage.176 Here, too, an individual guilty of that crime is
almost certain to be guilty of some combination of other crimes against humanity
(such as forced labor, enslavement, sexual slavery, or forced pregnancy) for the
same impugned acts. However, forced marriage was elaborated on the grounds
that, even in aggregate, those other offenses do not fully capture the wrongfulness
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of forcibly rendering someone a spouse.177 In the landmark SCSL judgment,
forced marriage was deemed to include “a forced conjugal association” that is
distinctive in its exclusivity, its entailment of mutual obligations, and in inflicting
a particular form of “long-term social stigmatization” arising from the marital
association, with all of the challenges that poses for community reintegration.178
Further exemplifying the importance of moral meaning in the expression of
international criminal law is the Rome Statute’s approach to the crime against
humanity of persecution. Article 7(1)(h) provides that persecution must be
committed “in connection with” a “crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”179
As such, acts qualifying for this crime are guaranteed also to qualify for at least
one other ICC crime. To charge such acts as persecution, rather than the
alternative ICC crime, is meaningful only in identifying discriminatory intent.
There is no formal penalty differential between the criminal categories, and
discriminatory intent can anyway be an exacerbating factor in sentencing for any
crime.180 As such, the value of the distinct category inheres not in its implications
for retribution, deterrence, or coordination, but rather in enabling the specific
condemnation of discriminatory atrocity.181
Ultimately, for a practice to qualify as an international crime, it must be
assumed from the legal point of view that it entails a particular kind of wrong. A
normative account of the crime responds to the imperative to clarify that moral
meaning and to distinguish the meanings of overlapping prohibitions, thus
respecting the rights of victims and the accused and ensuring the integrity of
criminal law’s expressive function. A normative account can also shed light on
interpretive questions, inform charging and other prosecutorial decisions in
contexts of scarce resources, and help to sharpen the work of civil society actors
seeking to use systems of international criminal justice as part of a broader
strategic response to malign policies. 182

F. Categories of Criminal Wrongdoing in War
In contemplating the appropriate account of starvation, it is worth reflecting
on the range of kinds of wrongdoing covered by war crimes law. One way of
classifying those crimes would map them onto roughly the following issue areas:
177
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•

attacking legally protected persons in the conduct of hostilities
(such as surrendering or wounded combatants, medical personnel,
humanitarian actors, peacekeepers, or civilians [including via
disproportionate or indiscriminate attack]);
• mistreating individuals under one’s immediate custody or control
(including by inflicting outrages upon their dignity, subjecting them
to cruel treatment, mutilation, medical experimentation, murder, or
torture, using them as hostages, or prosecuting them without fair
trial protections);
• sexual or gender-based violence (including inflicting outrages upon
dignity, engaging in rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and other forms of sexual
violence);
• pillaging property or attacking or causing excessive damage to
protected objects (such as civilian property, medical or
humanitarian material, units, or transport, cultural heritage, and the
environment);
• drawing on or compelling the combatancy of persons protected
from performing that function (such as children, enemy nationals,
or enemy prisoners of war);
• deporting, forcibly transferring, or inflicting collective punishment
on the civilian population;
• abusing the control afforded by belligerent occupation (such as by
transferring one’s own population into the occupied territory);
• endangering persons or undermining the law of armed conflict by
engaging in certain rule-breaking conduct that is prohibited even
when no malign consequence arises (such as using prohibited
weapons or declaring no quarter); and
• exploiting the laws of war in ways that put innocent persons at
heightened risk (such as by using human shields, engaging in
perfidy, or making improper use of flags of truce or medical
emblems).
To be clear, this is not a formal classification; one could draw the lines
differently. Moreover, there are overlapping normative features across these
clusters, as well as important elements that distinguish the individual crimes within
each cluster, as the unique expressive value of each crime demands. 183 For
example, one might distinguish child soldiering from other forms of compelled
participation in armed conflict due to the distinctive concerns associated with the
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protection of children, as compared to adults. Nonetheless, the categorization
above indicates the expressive diversity within the war crimes category.
In contemplating the place of the starvation war crime in this framework, it
is worth noting that most manifestations of starvation of civilians as a method of
warfare could in principle qualify for multiple war crimes, including attacks on
civilians, collective punishment, forced transfer or deportation, indiscriminate (or
disproportionate) attacks, and attacks on civilian or other protected objects. 184
Cases of widespread or systematic starvation (which might be thought to include
all instances of starvation as a “method” of warfare)185 could also qualify as one
or more crimes against humanity, including, most obviously, murder,
extermination, forcible transfer, or other inhumane acts.186 A persuasive
normative account of the starvation crime ought to make sense of it as a war
crime, while also identifying the features that warrant its distinct articulation and
application.

IV. S TARVATION AS A F ORM OF A TTAC K ON C IVILIANS
The simplest account of the core wrong of illegal starvation tactics is that
such methods inflict a range of harms, and ultimately death, on a category of
persons not liable to be attacked in that way, even in war—namely, civilians who
are not taking a direct part in hostilities. At the very least, starvation tactics
endanger civilians in those respects. Thus understood, the crime of using
starvation of civilians as a method of warfare might be thought to fit primarily and
straightforwardly within the first cluster of war crimes in the list above, as a form
of attack on a protected category of persons (civilians).
This is a common theory of the crime. One of the leading commentaries on
the Rome Statute identifies article 8(2)(b)(xxv) as fundamentally “an application
of the prohibition to attack civilians.”187 Contributors to a key IHL text argue
similarly that the starvation ban is “[d]erived from the principle of distinction.”188
The International Committee of the Red Cross’s commentary on the underlying
rules in the Additional Protocols supports this position, describing the prohibition
on starvation methods in Article 14 of Protocol II as “really only a specific
application of common Article 3, which imposes on parties to the conflict the
184
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obligation to guarantee humane treatment for all persons not participating in
hostilities, and in particular prohibits violence to life.”189 Announcing an
indictment related to alleged war crimes perpetrated in Sudan between 1998 and
2003, the Åklagarmyndigheten (Swedish Prosecution Authority) offered the
practice of burning crops as an example of an indiscriminate attack or an attack
on civilians.190 The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur approvingly
cited the U.K. Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict for the view that the starvation
ban “follows” from the legal fact that “[v]iolence to the life and person of civilians
is prohibited, whatever method is adopted to achieve it.”191 It is, on that
interpretation, a prohibition rooted ultimately in the right to life.192
Notwithstanding the complexity associated with the meaning of “attack” or
“violence” in IHL,193 the U.K. Manual extends this reasoning to sieges, blockades,
and the “blocking of relief supplies with the intent of causing starvation.”194 Along
similar lines, the fact that starvation tactics lead ultimately to the infliction of death
is thought to implicate extermination (mass-murder) as the primary manifestation
of this wrong in the crimes against humanity category.195

A. The Distinct Role of the Starvation Crime Among Attacks
on Civilians
On the one hand, this common view of the prohibition’s normative core
gains credibility from its fit with the general criminality of attacking civilians and
civilian populations. On the other hand, precisely that connection raises the
question of whether the starvation ban has a distinct function or meaning that
cannot be subsumed by the general prohibition and criminalization of attacks on
civilians.196 Several such functions might be invoked.
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First, the separate articulation of the starvation ban eliminates any ambiguity
as to whether the principle underpinning the ban on attacking civilians also applies
legally to methods that inflict the same fundamental wrong via a different route.
Until relatively recently, the application of that underlying principle to
encirclement starvation was not obvious.197 Walzer observed of the normative
posture of what he terms the “war convention”198 as it existed shortly before the
agreement of the Additional Protocols, “If there is a general rule that civilian
deaths must not be aimed at, the siege is a great exception.”199
In light of both the historical permissibility of siege warfare and ongoing
debates regarding the meaning of “attack” in IHL, it could prove complicated to
rely on the war crime of attacking civilians as the basis for prosecuting
encirclement deprivation.200 Notably, in his defense of the permissibility of such
tactics, Watts (like Walzer) is explicit about the status of siege starvation as a
normative “outlier” compared to the rules protecting civilians from attack in
IHL.201 Given that context, the specific criminalization of starvation methods,
including with explicit reference to deprivation by impeding the delivery of relief
supplies, can be understood to serve the function of dispelling doubt about
whether such methods are covered by the more general war crimes related to the
protection of civilians.
Second, the separate articulation of the starvation crime might be thought to
obviate some of the practical obstacles associated with attaching other war crimes
and crimes against humanity to starvation methods. At the crux of these
difficulties is the fact that the outcome to which the criminal proscription is
putatively attentive (namely, death) is several steps removed from the impugned
conduct. The ultimate cause of death in famines is typically not starvation itself,
but infection with one or more of the communicable diseases that proliferate in
such situations.202 Depriving populations of essentials enables such proliferation,
but outbreaks inevitably involve multiple factors, including complications arising
from the policies of the besieged authorities.203
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That reality affects the viability of any criminal prohibition that requires
establishing that the impugned conduct caused a proscribed consequence.204 At
the ICC, that category of prohibitions includes the war crimes of killing, murder,
willfully causing great suffering, inflicting excessive collateral injury or death on
civilians, and the crimes against humanity of murder and extermination. 205 At the
ad hoc tribunals, the crime of attacking civilians was considered established only
if the attacks could be shown to have caused death or serious injury.206 The latter
requirement has not been incorporated into the corollary ICC crime, but the
aforementioned ambiguities regarding the meaning of “attack” remain pertinent
in that context.207
These obstacles are not hypothetical. The Supreme Court Chamber of the
ECCC reversed a finding of extermination associated with the starvation of
persons during the transfer of hundreds of thousands under the Khmer Rouge on
the grounds that the link between mass deprivation and large-scale death was not
established.208 In the context of the siege of Sarajevo, the U.N. Commission of
Experts found the supply of essentials to have been “extremely limited” but
determined that there was no indication that this had caused deaths.209 The
implication was clear: “As no one appears to have died of starvation, cold, or
dehydration in Sarajevo, it is unlikely anyone could be held liable” for siege
starvation.210 The policies of the besieged Sarajevan authorities further
complicated the question of causation.211 Seen in this light, the ICC starvation
crime might be thought to provide distinctive value by focusing on endangerment
and thus eliminating the peculiar difficulty of establishing causation in this context.
Third, the distinct articulation of starvation within the normative cluster of
attacks on civilians and other protected persons might also be thought to enable
the precise identification of a particular form of that wrong. Starvation inflicts
specific kinds of physical and psychological suffering, has life-changing impacts
on children, heightens the affected population’s vulnerability to the spread of
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See DE WAAL, supra note 4, at 22–23.
See ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 80, at 5–6, 13, 15, 19, 31.
See Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 66–67 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 17, 2004).
See ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 80, at 18, 34. See supra note 193.
See Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon Chea & Khieu Samphan, Case File No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/SC
F36, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 536–57 (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Nov. 23,
2016).
U.N. Comm. Rep. Sarajevo, supra note 67, ¶ 75.
Id. ¶ 77.
See id. ¶ 87. The Commission was considering the siege through the lens of starvation of civilians
as a method of warfare. However, it did so prior to the crime’s codification. When codification
occurred through the Rome Statute, it was made clear that civilian harm or death is not a
consequence element of the crime. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 80, at 31.

Winter 2022

405

Chicago Journal of International Law

infectious disease, contributes to mass displacement and economic deprivation,
portends transgenerational reverberating effects, and ultimately kills via these and
other mechanisms.212 Although kinetic attacks on civilians also cause a spectrum
of immediate and reverberating harms, both the longer temporal dimension and
the nature of the harms associated with starvation are distinctive.213 Thus,
starvation tactics have been described as inflicting “death in slow motion.” 214
Characterized in that way, the starvation crime might be understood to serve a
function within its war crimes cluster parallel to that served by the act of inflicting
conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction within the
umbrella category of genocide.215
In sum, on this common view, the basic wrong at the heart of the starvation
crime is the targeted or indiscriminate endangerment of persons who ought not
be attacked in that way even in armed conflict. Codifying a distinct starvation
crime within that broader category serves three functions. First, it removes any
ambiguity regarding the criminality of starvation by encirclement or by the
removal of essentials. Second, it obviates the unique challenge of establishing
causation in this context. Third, it allows for a more precise condemnation of the
particular forms of suffering and death specific to starvation methods.

B. Necessity Revisited: Graduality and Civilian Harm
Accepting this account, one might think that the straightforward interpretive
implication would be that civilian starvation should be understood to be broadly
and categorically prohibited. As noted above, attacks targeting civilians are
prohibited and criminal.216 Similarly, it is prohibited for belligerents to engage in
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See, e.g., Conley & de Waal, supra note 4, at 701–03; Jordash, Murdoch & Holmes, supra note 74, at
850; Antonio Coco, Jérôme de Hemptinne & Brian Lander, International Law Against Starvation in
Armed Conflict: Epilogue to a Multi-faceted Study, 17 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 913, 913 (2019); IIFFMM,
Detailed Findings (2019), supra note 8; Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Comm’n of Inquiry on
Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1,
¶ 542–553 (Feb. 7, 2014) [hereinafter DPRK Report Detailed Findings]; Cesar G. Victora et al.,
Maternal and Child Undernutrition: Consequences for Adult Health and Human Capital, 371 LANCET 340
(2008).
On the reverberating effects of kinetic attacks, see, for example, Isabel Robinson & Ellen Nohle,
Proportionality and Precautions in Attack, 98 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 107 (2017).
Ventura, supra note 75, at 792. See id. at 798 (starvation and death are “two sides of the same coin”).
Describing this underlying act as genocide by “measures of slow death,” see Independent
International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/CRP.2, ¶ 1400 (Sept. 17,
2018). Identifying starvation methods as potentially genocidal via this underlying act, see ICC
Elements of Crimes, supra note 80, at 3 n.4; Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, Appeal
Judgment, ¶ 226 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Apr. 8, 2015); Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 506 (Sept. 2, 1998); Ventura, supra note 75, at 810 (noting
that this category “matches [starvation] perfectly”).
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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attacks that fail to distinguish between civilians and combatants (or other military
objectives) or that use means or methods of warfare that cannot be directed at a
specific military objective.217 Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited and criminal
under customary international law.218 Although the Rome Statute does not address
such attacks explicitly, an ICC Trial Chamber has determined that attacks inflicted
“indiscriminately” on “civilians and fighters alike” amount to conduct undertaken
with a dual purpose of targeting both combatants and civilians.219 Moreover,
populations comprised predominantly of civilians retain their protected status
under that rule, even when there are combatants ensconced within.220 The
customary and Rome Statute war crime of attacking such a population attaches
when the population as a whole is made the target of attack. 221
These prohibitions are categorical. It is criminal to attack civilians or the
civilian population regardless of the military advantage that such an attack might
return, regardless of whether the ultimate goal is to inflict suffering on civilians or
to neutralize the combatants ensconced within, and regardless of whether there
are other available routes to military success. Although there are ongoing disputes
about precisely when explosive weapons with wide-area effects may be used in
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See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.
See AP I, supra note 44, art 51(4–5); Hum. Rts. Council, Situation of Hum. Rts. in Yemen, Including
Violations and Abuses Since September 2014: Rep. of the Group of Eminent Int’l and Reg’l Experts
as submitted to the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., ¶¶ 32–34, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/42/17 (Aug.
9, 2019); Group of Experts on Yemen, Detailed Findings (2019), supra note 7, ¶ 316. See also supra
note 121.
Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-2359, Judgment, ¶ 923 (July 8, 2019),
https://perma.cc/LF76-5ZDK. See also id. at ¶¶ 926, 1057; Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC01/04-01/07-3436, Judgment, ¶ 802 (Mar. 7, 2014), https://perma.cc/J4BE-ENA3.
See AP I, supra note 44, art. 50(3). The ICTY held repeatedly that “a population may qualify as
civilian as long as it is predominantly civilian,” finding on that basis that “the population of the
urban areas inside the confrontation lines of Sarajevo between 1992 and 1995 had civilian status as
a whole,” notwithstanding the presence of combatants in those areas. Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case
No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment ¶ 4610 n.15510 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24,
2016). See also id. ¶ 474; Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 135–38
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006); Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case
No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 50 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec.17, 2004);
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 115 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July 29, 2004). The ICC has affirmed this principle in its own jurisprudence. Katanga,
ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, Judgment at ¶ 1105.
On the IHL prohibition of attacks on civilian populations, as distinct from specific civilians, see AP
I, supra note 44, art. 51(2); AP II, supra note 44, art. 13(2). For the criminality of attacking civilian
populations as distinct from specific civilians, see AP I, supra note 44, art. 85(3)(a); Rome Statute,
supra note 1, arts. 8(2)(b)(i), (e)(i). The Ntaganda Appeals Chamber at the ICC clarified recently that
the targeting of a civilian population without distinction between civilians and combatants can
qualify as an attack directed against a civilian population. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-2666-Red,
Appeal Judgment at ¶¶ 418, 424, 491 (Mar. 30, 2021), https://perma.cc/6P2E-EJ8G. See also Galić,
Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeal Judgment at ¶¶ 131–38.
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populated areas,222 it is clear that the ban on attacks that fail to distinguish between
civilians and combatants or that use means or methods incapable of such
distinction applies even if their indiscriminate fire may have been motivated by
apparently benign goals, such as force protection,223 and even if the attacking party
lacked alternative means.224 Military advantage can be invoked to justify attacks
inflicting civilian loss only when that loss is part of the collateral damage arising
from discriminate operations targeted at specific military objectives. Even then,
the civilian loss expected cannot legally be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated.225
Through these rules, contemporary IHL protects the right of civilians not to
be instrumentalized or treated as expendable in war, unless they have acted to
forfeit that right through participating directly in hostilities.226 Assuming the
starvation crime to be rooted in that same principle, one might think that the
method would be subject to a similarly categorical proscription. On that view, a
starvation siege that deprives the encircled (civilian) population of essentials to
starve out the combatants within would be straightforwardly prohibited, as would
deprivation operations that inflict starvation on combatants and civilians without
discrimination. As with any other attack on civilians or the civilian population,
military advantage would offer no basis for interpreting the prohibition more
permissively.
And yet, as discussed above, military necessity is understood by some to
demand a less stringent approach in the starvation context.227 On that view,
military imperatives demand that the targeted starvation of encircled (civilian)
populations and the indiscriminate starvation of combatants and civilians are (or
at least should be) permissible in siege situations as long as they are performed
with a view to starving out the combatants ensconced within, rather than
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Cf. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES
OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 19–22 (2019), https://perma.cc/23TP-ZYSH [hereinafter
ICRC CHALLENGES 2019]; INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 47–53 (2015),
https://perma.cc/RT7W-34L9; INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 40–42
(2011), https://perma.cc/Z8MF-AVKP; Laurent Gisel, The Use of Explosive Weapons in Densely
Populated Areas and the Prohibition of Indiscriminate Attacks, in Conduct of Hostilities: the Practice, the
Law and the Future 100, 103 (Edoardo Greppi ed., 2014); Remarks by Department of Defense General
Counsel Paul C. Ney Jr. on the Law of War, Just Sec. (May 28, 2019), https://perma.cc/N4DA-SBAP.
See ICRC CHALLENGES 2019, supra note 222, at 21.
See supra note 120.
See AP I, supra note 44, art. 51(5)(b); Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
Seeking to reconcile this principle with the permissibility of the infliction of proportionate collateral
harm arising from discriminate operations, see HAQUE, supra note 129, ch. 8.
See supra Sections II.B & III.A.
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weaponizing civilian suffering.228 To be persuasive, such arguments must explain
why the military utility of siege deprivation is sufficient to override the pro tanto
claims of the affected civilians, when those same civilians have normatively and
legally dispositive claims against being subjected to analogous kinetic attacks.229
The relevant normative distinction between encirclement deprivation and
kinetic attacks cannot inhere either in the fact of military utility (which is both
contingent and applicable in principle to either method) or in the ultimate impact
on the civilian population (which can be similarly severe in either case). Most
plausibly, it would inhere instead in the divergence in the methods’ respective
temporal scopes and the implications of that divergence for harm, intent, and
responsibility.
Kinetic attacks on civilian populations are characterized primarily by their
immediate consequences. Even their reverberating effects are not easily reversed
after the fact.230 When a bomb is dropped, the fullness of the harm entailed is
inflicted or set irreversibly in motion. Those killed and maimed are killed and
maimed in that moment. The suffering of survivors endures and can be mitigated
or exacerbated over time, but its fundamental source is set. The immediacy of
these consequences is such that engaging deliberately in the attack entails adopting
an intentional posture towards the infliction of civilian harm and death.
The infliction of civilian harm in a siege occurs on a different trajectory.
Rather than a moment of immediacy, it is a process of steady escalation, the pace
of which can be described comparatively as “glacial.”231 One of the consequences
of that graduality is that the apocalyptic conclusion of famine and mass fatality is
relatively uncertain and distant in the early stages. Therefore, whereas the
commander who orders kinetic attacks on a civilian population cannot avoid an
intentional posture with respect to the resultant civilian harm and death, those
involved in siege deprivation may seek to characterize their intention in terms of
stimulating capitulation before there is any significant civilian loss.
In that vein, Dinstein insists that Protocol I “completely fails to take into
account the inherent nature of siege warfare,” namely that “a siege does not
generate starvation for the purpose of killing civilians with hunger, but only in
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On the distinction between those who think they are and those who think they ought to be, see
supra notes 96–107 and accompanying text.
Occasionally, those advocating the permissibility of encirclement deprivation also advocate the
permissibility of indiscriminate kinetic attack. See supra note 133.
Reverberating effects could include the harm arising from the dispersal of unexploded ordnance or
the destruction of units providing essential services. Robinson & Nohle, supra note 213; IIFFMM,
Detailed Findings (2019), supra note 8, ¶¶ 407, 571; ICRC CHALLENGES 2019, supra note 222, at 20.
Beehner, Berti & Jackson, supra note 26, at 82. The approach of the besieging party is to “achieve a
decision . . . or to slowly destroy the besieged.” Fox, supra note 26, at 2.
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order to cause the encircled town to surrender.”232 Various authorities, including
some military manuals, adopt a similar way of framing the practice, describing the
goal as “forcing [ ] surrender,”233 eliciting “submission,”234 or generating
“capitulation,”235 as explicitly distinct from purposefully “killing [the inhabitants]
with hunger.”236 Hampson argues that often “the besieging force” structures the
deprivation so as “to let [the besieged civilian population] go significantly hungry”
but not to starve to death.237 Although this may entail subjecting civilians to “years
with not enough to maintain healthy bodily functions,” she is skeptical that it
should be understood as prohibited under the current rules: “starvation is
starvation, it is not hunger.”238
The point is partly comparative. Encirclement deprivation is framed on this
view as “limit[ing] the heavy civilian casualties often associated with urban
fighting.”239 It is a way to “subdue an enemy while limiting direct hostilities”240 and
“avoiding a large-scale atrocity.”241 The alternative routes to taking the defended
locality may be expected to “increase the intensity of the fighting and the
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Dinstein, supra note 96, at 151. Invoking and building on Dinstein’s argument here, see Waxman,
supra note 69, at 418–19.
U.K. LOAC MANUAL, supra note 69, ¶ 5.34.1 (on the objective of “forcing . . . surrender”).
U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 66, § 5.19.1 (on aiming at “submission”).
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Watts, supra note 66, at 15 (on speeding “capitulation”).
George Alfred Mudge, Starvation as a Means of Warfare, 4 INT’L L. 228, 246 (1970) (noting that “[t]he
definition does not read ‘for the purpose of killing them with hunger’ but only ‘for the purpose of
starving them into surrender.’ . . . The implicit definition of starvation assumes that there will be a
military effect, i.e., capitulation of the besieged locality”).
Hampson, supra note 93, at 99 (2016). Dov Weisglass, senior advisor to former Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert, made a similar point in particularly callous terms, defending the Israeli
blockade of Gaza by describing the goal as “to put the Palestinians on a diet, but not to make them
die of hunger.” Conal Urquhart, Gaza on Brink of Implosion as Aid Cut-Off Starts to Bite, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 15, 2006), https://perma.cc/HPV9-USXU. See also Cedric Ryngaert, Humanitarian Assistance
and the Conundrum of Consent: A Legal Perspective, 5 AMSTERDAM L. FORUM 5, 8 (2013) (“One can argue
that denying access to outside humanitarian actors could lead to starvation and thus amount not
only to a violation of the humanitarian law prohibition of starvation, but also of the (human) right
to life . . . From this perspective states could only deny access if such denial will not result in the
deaths of individuals deprived of assistance.”).
Hampson, supra note 93, at 99. Notably, Hampson does also worry that too much focus (legally) is
placed on starvation at the expense of this lesser harm. Id.
ICRC CHALLENGES 2019, supra note 222, at 23. On the dangers of urban combat for civilians, see
Id. at 16–18; Nathalie Durhin, Protecting Civilians in Urban Areas, 98 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 177, 178–
79 (2017).
Beehner, Berti & Jackson, supra note 26, at 78.
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associated risks of incidental harm for civilians,”242 or, worse, may lead to the
temptation to “flatten cities and inflict massive suffering.”243
Of course, encirclement deprivation also threatens massive suffering. And
although threatening a wrong is generally not as bad as consummating the threat,
threats can themselves have psychological consequences sufficiently grave to
warrant war crime status.244 Moreover, starvation methods rarely if ever work as
pure threats.245 Capitulation is a response to the escalation of deprivation, not its
prospect. Any effort to distinguish starvation methods must grapple with that
reality.
Those who defend the permissibility of encirclement deprivation might
argue that there is a normatively meaningful difference between the gradual
escalation of suffering in that process and the execution of the threat of a kinetic
attack on civilians. The latter entails a binary shift from hypothetical to real killing
and maiming. Although the execution of such threats can be incremental at the
aggregate level, as in the case of a series of small-scale terror attacks on random
civilians, this aggregate incrementalism operates alongside an individual
binarism—there is nothing gradual about what is done to the direct victims of
such attacks.246 In contrast, the continuation of a siege entails (at each stage) an
escalation of suffering that is not only incremental in aggregate, but incremental
for the affected individuals. Parts of the population are affected sooner and more
acutely than others, but even for the hardest hit, the consequences develop over
time. Irreversible impacts, such as death or permanent health effects, occur not in
an explosive instant, but through a cumulative and extended process, arising from
the combination of the continuous series of decisions to persist with the siege and
various intervening factors that may exacerbate or ameliorate its effects.247
With encirclement deprivation understood in these terms, it might be argued
that intent vis-à-vis its effects can be updated and reframed continually according
to the ever-present possibility of capitulation. If one were to accept the
controversial normative premise that suffering inflicted up to that point can be
treated as a moral sunk cost, even the continuation of a deprivation siege in the
late stages might be framed in terms of the besieging party’s ongoing hope that
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Fox, supra note 26, at 4.
See Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 32–36 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 12, 2009); Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeal
Judgment, ¶¶ 91, 100–02 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006).
See, e.g., supra notes 4–11 and accompanying text.
See Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 582–94, 597 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
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capitulation is imminent.248 Although civilians would have a significant pro tanto
claim against that continuation, the combination of incrementalism and the
permanent offer of a way out might be invoked to suggest the possibility of a
different and more accommodating path to the justification of encirclement
deprivation than is available for indiscriminate bombardment or other violent
attacks on civilian populations.
In sum, whereas attacking the civilian population entails the intentional
killing or maiming of civilians who have not lost their protection from targeting,
siege deprivation entails the scalar escalation of pressure combined (at least in
principle) with the constant offer of a path to the avoidance of the escalating
harm.249 As such, the discrimination between civilians and combatants absent
from the initial deprivation is always possible, including through civilians’ own
willingness to accept the available egress or through their leadership’s capitulation.
Therefore, although the coercive imposition of deprivation entails a pro tanto
wrong, it might be argued to be less severe and direct an abrogation of the rights
of those affected than would be inflicted by a kinetic attack. Indeed, some argue
that civilians who eschew egress when it is offered thereby forfeit any right not to
be subject to the starvation regime.250
Overall, there appears to be a two-step normative structure to the claim that
siege starvation is appropriately subject to a less restrictive framework under IHL
than are analogous kinetic operations. First, just as with a bombing campaign or
an urban assault, the pro tanto wrongfulness of starvation methods inheres in the
targeted or indiscriminate harm and death inflicted on persons not liable to such
attacks. As such, starvation methods and direct kinetic attacks can be evaluated
on the same dimension. Second, the fact that encirclement starvation inflicts those
harms via gradual and incremental escalation, rather than through an act of
immediate violence has normatively significant implications for whether and how
that wrong is realized. In particular, encirclement starvation reduces the harm
intended by the besieging party at any point, allows in principle for the continuous
possibility of escape from that harm, and mitigates the besieging party’s
responsibility for harm that could have been avoided by capitulation or civilian
egress. Or so the argument might go.
Even on its own terms, this line of reasoning has several significant and
interrelated infirmities. First, it relies on the assumption that siege starvation can
be effective prior to the ultimate infliction of widespread civilian harm or death.
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This is the “prospective view” pursuant to which past harms are moral sunk costs and the moral
viability of the action going forward depends exclusively on harms expected in the future. Seth
Lazar, Moral Sunk Costs, 68 PHIL. Q. 841, 842, 844 (2018).
See DINSTEIN, supra note 69, at 256–57. On the offer of egress, see supra note 69.
See, e.g., U.K. LOAC MANUAL, supra note 69, ¶ 5.34.3; J. M. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 164
(1911). Channeling arguments to this effect, see Mudge, supra note 236, at 236, 241.
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Without that assumption, the notion that intent can be framed around imminent
capitulation lacks credibility. And yet, the assumed efficiency of the method is
belied by experience. Even “successful” encirclements are often extended and
devastating in their effects.251 It is true, of course, that the efficacy and cost of a
given method are always variable. However, given the stakes, the invocation of
military necessity in this kind of argument depends for its normative credibility on
a particularly robust set of empirical presumptions.
Second, it is distorting to evaluate each incremental decision to initiate or
continue a siege or other starvation method in isolation. Encirclement deprivation
can have a broad and calamitous aggregate impact over time. 252 The length of the
timeline on which that cumulative harm manifests may dull our attentiveness to
it, but that reality only emphasizes the importance of elevating its urgency in law.253
Certainly, the hope of a quick and relatively harmless resolution cannot justify
evaluating the initiation of a starvation campaign without reference to its likely or
expected implications over the full course of its implementation. Similarly,
assessing the continuation of a long-standing siege with exclusive reference to the
immediate future relies on the controversial notion that the prior accumulation of
wrongful harm and suffering can be dismissed as normatively irrelevant to the
decision to persist.254 Particularly when that prior suffering and the projected
future impact are intimately connected as the results of the continuous execution
of a single overarching threat, such a disaggregated evaluation is not persuasive.
Third, that civilian egress or capitulation could have avoided or limited the
harm of a starvation siege does not mitigate the perpetrator’s responsibility for the
harm inflicted. Civilians are under no obligation to leave the encircled area. When
they decline to do so, it is legally unambiguous that they do not thereby participate
in hostilities or become liable to be targeted.255 When they are forced not to leave
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See Conley & de Waal, supra note 4, at 709–11; Beehner, Berti & Jackson, supra note 26, at 81;
Provost, supra note 40, at 619–22. Recall the aforementioned report on Syria, which recognized the
method as having been notably “successful for overtaking opposition-held territory” in the conflict
but at the cost of proving “disastrous for civilians.” Independent Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Syria
Rep., supra note 87, ¶ 95; Hum Rts. Council, The Siege and Recapture of Eastern Ghouta: Conf.
Room Paper of the Indep. Int’ Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶¶ 31–37, U.N.
Doc. A/HTC/38/CRP.3 (June 20, 2018). See also supra notes 4–11 and accompanying text.
See supra note 251. Indeed, many who argue that encirclement deprivation remains lawful are
clear-eyed about this reality. Watts, supra note 66, at 4; Drew, supra note 66, at 309 n.34.
See Brian Lander & Rebecca Vetharaniam Richards, Addressing Hunger and Starvation in Situations of
Armed Conflict - Laying the Foundations for Peace, 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 675, 683–84 (2019) (noting the
slowness with which officials react to the slow devastation of mass starvation.).
Critiquing this perspective in other contexts, such as jus ad bellum proportionality, see generally
Lazar, supra note 248.
See GILLARD, supra note 111, at 12. The direct participation in hostilities threshold is provided in
AP I, supra note 44, art. 51(3). What surpasses that threshold is subject to debate, with voluntary
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by the besieged party, this does not exempt the besieging party from its
responsibilities towards them; rather, it indicates the shared responsibility of the
two warring parties for those civilians’ fates.256 That the besieged and besieging
authorities share responsibility in such a situation entails neither that responsibility
is divided, nor that the responsibility of the besieging party is in any other way
diminished; it simply means that multiple actors bear responsibility for the wrong.
Even those civilians who do flee to escape starvation may well be victims of the
crime against humanity of forced movement.257
However, these problems with the two-step argument for a permissive
posture with respect to siege starvation are not the most fundamental. The deeper
problem concerns the conceptualization of the normative underpinnings of the
crime. Siege starvation is not merely an anomalously slow mechanism by which
harm or death is inflicted in war. As elaborated in the next two Sections, it is better
understood as a process by which biological imperatives are turned against
fundamental human capabilities in a manner more normatively reminiscent of
torture than it is of a kinetic attack. This torturous nature of mass deprivation
shows the graduality of the method to be not a mitigating element, but a key aspect
of its distinctive wrongfulness. Understanding the crime in this way provides the
basis for an argument for its categorical prohibition.

V. T ORTU RE , N E CE SSITY , AND THE W AR B E TWE E N B IOLOGY
AND S E LF
As reconstructed in the previous Section, the necessity argument for the
permissibility of encirclement starvation bears striking resemblance to necessity
arguments sometimes invoked to defend the use of torture in interrogation. As
elaborated below, the responses to the latter arguments can shed light on how to
think about necessity and wrongfulness in siege starvation.
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human shields falling into the zone of disagreement. Compare INT’L COMM. RED CROSS,
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 56–57 (2009), with HCJ 769/02, Pub. Comm. Against
Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel, (2) IsrLR 459, 498 (2006). However, whatever one makes of
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Health, Paul Hunt; Representative of the Secretary-General on Hum. Rts. of Internally Displaced
Persons, Walter Kälin; Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to
an Adequate Standard of Living, Miloon Kothari: Mission to Lebanon and Israel, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/2/7 (Oct. 2, 2006); ICRC CHALLENGES 2019, supra note 222, at 17, 25. Also on the
importance of preserving respect for civilian status in such circumstances, see Provost, supra note
40, at 619.
On the besieged party’s duties, see AP I, supra note 44, arts. 51(7), 58. On irrelevance of their
violation for duties of besieging party, see id. art. 51(8); GILLARD, supra note 111, at 8.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 7(1)(d), (2)(d); AP I, supra note 44, art. 54(3)(b).
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A. Necessity in the Torture Debates
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) states the unequivocal position of international
law: “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat
of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked
as a justification of torture.”258 The European Court of Human Rights takes this
to reflect a deeper moral truth: “The philosophical basis underpinning the
absolute nature of the right under Article 3 does not allow for any exceptions or
justifying factors or balancing of interests.”259 The ban on torture is among the
clearest red lines in international law’s protection of the human being.
This absolutism notwithstanding, skeptics of the categorical ban have long
argued for a necessity exception. The “ticking bomb” scenario has so pervaded
discussion on the issue as to require no introduction here.260 It informed the highly
criticized and ultimately withdrawn executive branch legal memoranda during the
George W. Bush administration;261 it was invoked by multiple candidates,
including the eventual winner, in the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign;262 and it has
informed the controversially permissive posture of the Israeli Supreme Court. 263
As in the context of siege starvation, necessity has been invoked in both claims
about proper legal interpretation and claims about what the law ought to be.
258

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
art. 2(2), 1456 U.N.T.S. 113 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter CAT].

259

Gäfgen, Eur. Ct. H.R. [GC], App. No. 22978/05, ¶ 107.
For a wide range of views on the issue, see generally TORTURE: A COLLECTION (Sanford Levinson
ed. 2004).
See Jay S. Bybee, Office Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Memorandum for Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C §§
2340–2340A, 31–33, 39–45 (Aug. 1, 2002); CIA OFFICE GENERAL COUNSEL, Draft: Legal
Appendix, Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers (Nov. 26, 2001); SENATE
SELECT COMM. ON INTEL., COMMITTEE STUDY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S
DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 181, 197 n.1155 (2014),
https://perma.cc/WDZ6-GYYF.
See Jonathan Swan, Trump Calls for ‘Hell of a lot Worse than Waterboarding’, HILL (Feb. 6, 2016),
https://perma.cc/R5XT-HBYP.
See HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel, 53(4) PD ¶¶ 3638 (1999)
(allowing for the possibility that an official who engages in otherwise criminal interrogation
techniques may “find refuge under [the ‘necessity’ defence’s] wings” on an ad hoc basis in light of
“a given set of facts,” but emphasizing that necessity “cannot serve as [the] basis for [an ex ante
administrative] authority” to employ such techniques); HCJ 9018/17 Tbeish v. Attorney General,
¶¶ 61–66 (2018) (Isr.) (holding that officials who engage in such techniques on the basis of necessity
“are entitled to an appropriate measure of legal certainty,” such that the Attorney General may
“detail[ ] [ ] circumstances that will be considered in reaching a decision whether the interrogators’
action falls within the scope of the necessity defense” and interrogators may act pursuant to those
guidelines and in consultation with their superiors without this system thereby falling afoul of the
principle that necessity cannot underpin an ex ante administrative authority).
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Thus far, efforts to claim a necessity exception in law have been rejected by
the overwhelming majority of legal authorities. Many have also pushed back on
the normative claim. As in the case of siege starvation, some question the
empirical premises or utility of the ticking bomb scenario. One common line of
argument along these lines challenges the premise that torture can produce
accurate information.264 Another contends that the ticking bomb scenario does
not reflect real-world conditions.265 A third holds that structuring a legal
permission around it would lead inevitably to a significantly broader and morally
unjustifiable opening for legally sanctioned torture.266 These are all plausible and
persuasive lines of rebuttal.
Another response, however, goes deeper, articulating the wrongfulness of
torture in a way that distinguishes it from other forms of violence or harm that
are thought to be more readily justifiable with reference to defensive necessity.
From this perspective, to get drawn into the empirical debate about whether
torture works is to concede too much. The independent and more fundamental
moral thesis is that such techniques are categorically wrongful, even if at least
some forms could be effective in some circumstances. Two arguments along these
lines are worth contemplating here.

B. The Wrongfulness of Torture
In a seminal 1978 paper, Henry Shue responds to a common form of the
necessity argument for the permissibility of torture.267 Shue frames the line of
thought to which he is responding as follows: “[S]ince killing is worse than torture
[in that the former involves the total destruction of the person, whereas the latter
involves only partial destruction], and killing is sometimes permitted, especially in
war, we ought sometimes to permit torture.”268 Rejecting the premise that the two
acts can be compared simply along the dimension of harmfulness, Shue sets out
to identify qualitatively distinctive aspects of torture that warrant treating it
differently from ordinary belligerent killing, even when the detainee is an adversary

267

See O’MARA, supra note 126, at 234.
See Kim Lane Scheppele, Hypothetical Torture in the ‘War on Terrorism,’ 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 285,
293–95, 305–07 (2005). See generally Henry Shue, Torture in Dreamland, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
231 (2006).
See Scheppele, supra note 265, at 307–18; Jeremy Bentham, Of Torture, reprinted in W.L. Twining &
P.E. Twining, Bentham on Torture, 24 N. IR. L. Q. 305, 308 (1973); Id. at 311 (“The great objection
against Torture is, that it is so liable to abuse.”); Oren Gross, The Prohibition on Torture and the Limits
of the Law, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 229 (Sanford Levinson ed. 2004).
Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124, 125 (1978).
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with information about an imminent threat, or at least appears to be so with as
high a probability as is necessary to render someone a legitimate target in war.269
Almost three decades later, in another influential contribution on the same
topic, David Sussman asked, “What is it about torture that sets it apart even from
killing, maiming, or imprisoning someone, such that the circumstances that might
justify inflicting such harms would not even begin to justify torture?”270 Shue’s and
Sussman’s answers are distinct in important ways, but they also share elements
that illuminate the wrongfulness of mass starvation.
For Shue, the first step in distinguishing torture morally is to recognize that
it is an attack on the defenseless.271 Torture begins, he argues, “only after the fight
is—for the victim—finished.” 272 As such, it is unlike “the killing in battle of a
healthy and well-armed foe.”273 It fails even a “weak constraint of being a ‘fair
fight.’”274 The victim is entirely at the torturer’s mercy, so the assault on her person
“sinks below even the well-regulated mutual slaughter of a justly fought war.”275
Sussman similarly emphasizes the “absolute” “asymmetry of power, knowledge,
and prerogative” between interrogator and detainee in a torture situation.276
Shue’s and Sussman’s shared premise is reflected in various respects in the
law. For torture to be established as a crime against humanity at the ICC, the
Rome Statute requires that the victims have been “in the custody or under the
control” of the perpetrator at the time of the abuse.277 Although there is no formal
element along those lines in the war crime definition,278 the crime applies only to
the torture of fighters rendered hors de combat, civilians, medical personnel, or
religious personnel taking no active part in the hostilities, and it is therefore
“difficult to conceive of the crime being committed” without control or
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The probability point is important because a common variant on the practical rebuttals to the
necessity claim noted above is that the interrogator does not know with absolute certainty that the
person interrogated in fact has the relevant information, and so risks inflicting suffering to no end.
This, of course, is also true in the context of lethal targeting in war. On the normative challenges
related to killing under uncertainty in war, see HAQUE, supra note 129, ch. 5; DANNENBAUM, supra
note 142, at 147–53.
David Sussman, What’s Wrong with Torture?, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 1, 3 (2005).
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custody.279 Similarly, a leading commentary on the CAT argues that torture
presupposes the exercise of “total control” by one person over another.280
Notwithstanding this profound asymmetry, Shue recognizes that the torture
victim’s defenselessness is, as a philosophical matter, open to objection.
Specifically, the defender of permissible torture might insist that a detainee is not
“utterly helpless in the face of unrestrainable assault as long as he or she holds in
reserve an act of compliance which would satisfy the torturer and bring the torture
to an end.”281 Along these lines, Sussman suggests that in the ticking bomb
scenario, one can frame the detainee’s “continued silence” as “part of his
attack.”282
Shue and Sussman are ultimately unpersuaded by such objections. For Shue,
the way out that is putatively available to the detainee with the information
necessary to stop the torture is, morally speaking, no way out at all. This is because
torture functions here as a way of overriding the victim’s fidelity to her own
higher-order commitments. For the detainee, compliance entails a “betrayal of
one’s ideals and one’s comrades.”283 This, Shue argues, is pivotal: “The possibility
of betrayal cannot be counted as an escape,”284 at least not when those
commitments are “profoundly held” (as the necessity of torture would seem to
suggest they are).285 In short, the distinctive wrongfulness of torture—that trait
which distinguishes it from other forms of bodily harm or death—inheres, on this
view, in the fact that it is an assault on the defenseless, whose only escape is a
“violation of integrity,” and is thus no escape at all.286
Sussman questions Shue’s framing insofar as it suggests that the wrong of
torture would appear to be greater the stronger the detainee’s commitment not to
comply, which, particularly in the case of someone presumed to have information
about a terrorist threat, may be thought a perverse result.287 Nonetheless, the
account he offers in place of Shue’s also defines torture’s singular wrongfulness
with reference to the infliction of the conditions of self-betrayal.288
279

280

281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288

WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE 244 (2d ed. 2016).
MANFRED NOWAK & ELIZABETH MCARTHUR, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE: A COMMENTARY 22, 76 (2008).
Shue, supra note 267, at 130.
Sussman, supra note 270, at 16.
Shue, supra note 267, at 135.
Id.
Id. at 141.
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See Sussman, supra note 270, at 18.
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In that vein, Sussman draws the following distinction:
Torture should be distinguished from both coercion and brainwashing, even
though all three may often overlap in particular cases. What is distinctive
about torture is that it aims to manipulate its victims through their own
responses, as agents, to the felt experience of their affects and emotions in a
context of dependence, vulnerability, and disorientation. Coercion, in
contrast, need only exploit the agent’s rational responses to the cognitive
content of these feelings. The coercer tries to influence his victims through
their own appreciation of their reasons for action. . . . In principle, we could
coerce a being that has no emotional life at all (e.g., a corporate agent such as
a state or a university), so long as this being had determinate interests that it
rationally pursued in part by anticipating the intentions and actions of other
rational agents. But we could not in principle torture this sort of artificial
person. 289

The key difference for the victim of torture, as opposed to the victim of
coercion, is that the former must confront the dilemma of whether to give in (and
thus violate her or his higher commitments) “not merely with respect to the
disvalue of pain and fear, but while caught up in the experience of these very
feelings themselves.”290 Being “caught up” in these feelings precludes deciding
reflectively in response to one’s higher-order commitments and the threats posed
by the coercive agent. As Sussman puts it, “[w]hen sufficiently intense, pain
becomes a person’s entire universe and his entire self, crowding out every other
aspect of his mental life. Unlike other harms, pain takes its victim’s agency apart
‘from the inside.’”291 This is because pain triggers a biological imperative—
“something like a bodily demand to change something about one’s condition.”292
As such, “[n]ormally, one cannot adopt a purely contemplative attitude toward
one’s own pain.”293
Shifting to using the first person to describe the victim’s perspective,
Sussman argues that the fact that pain is experienced as a demand from the
victim’s own body means that, although inflicted by the torturer and thus “not
unproblematically an exercise of my own agency (the way my reflectively adopted
commitments might be),” it is also not “something fully distinct from such
[T]orture forces its victim into the position of colluding against himself through
his own affects and emotions, so that he experiences himself as simultaneously
powerless and yet actively complicit in his own violation. So construed, torture
turns out to be not just an extreme form of cruelty, but the pre-eminent instance
of a kind of forced self-betrayal, more akin to rape than other kinds of violence
characteristic of warfare or police action.
Id. at 4.
289
Id. at 8–9.
290
Id. at 10.
291
Id. at 14.
292
Id. at 20.
293
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agency.”294 As such, “My suffering [as torture victim] is experienced as not just
something the torturer inflicts on me, but as something I do to myself, as a kind
of self-betrayal worked through my body and its feelings.”295 To be clear, it is not
necessary that the victim actually comply with the torturer’s demand and thus
perform the final act of self-betrayal. The wrong does not inhere in that
consequence. Rather, it inheres in twisting the body against the person: “Even if
the victim does not break, he will still characteristically discover within himself a
host of traitorous temptations.”296
Together, Shue and Sussman capture crucial features of what makes torture
distinctively wrongful. Torture is not simply the infliction of severe pain or
suffering on a defenseless victim; it is the weaponization of the biological
imperative to avoid pain and suffering to subjugate the victim’s higher-order
desires to her body’s demands. It uses the body to turn the victim against herself
and undermines one of the traits we take to be most fundamental to our
humanity—our capacity for higher-order commitments.

C. Connecting the Moral Theory of Torture with the Law
In addition to being philosophically illuminating on their own terms, these
arguments offer the foundation for a compelling account of the international legal
prohibition and criminalization of torture. The mere infliction of severe pain or
suffering is ordinarily not sufficient to establish torture. Rather, in most legal
definitions, the infliction of harm must be structured to turn the victim against
herself in one way or another.
The most prominent definition of torture is enshrined in Article 1 of the
CAT, which requires that the severe pain or suffering be:
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or
a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind.297

In each of these purposes is entailed a form of weaponization of the body
against the self—as a mechanism by which to cause self-betrayal through
confession or other undesired action, as a mechanism by which to bring the body
into conflict with past actions through punishment, or as a mechanism by which
to bring the body into conflict with identity through discrimination.
Torture’s purpose element is not marginal. As a leading commentary on the
CAT explains:
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the severity of pain or suffering, although constituting an essential element of
the definition of torture, is not a criterion distinguishing torture from cruel
and inhuman treatment. . . . Whether or not cruel or inhuman treatment can
also be qualified as torture depends . . . above all [on] whether inhuman
treatment was used for any of the purposes spelt out.298

Although central to the anti-torture regime, the CAT is not the only source
for the meaning of torture in international law. Nonetheless, something like the
purpose element it articulates has been recognized by a range of human rights
authorities, including those interpreting treaties that lack a detailed internal
definition of the concept.299
There are notable exceptions to this pattern.300 Indeed, the Rome Statute is
internally split on the issue, with the crime against humanity of torture including
no purpose element, but the war crime of torture requiring that the prosecutor
establish one of the wrongful purposes.301 However, as things stand, the purpose
element remains dominant; both the international criminal tribunals and the ICC
(in the war crimes context) have relied on it to distinguish torture from other
forms of mistreatment.302 Even in the Inter-American system, where the definition
of torture is explicitly not purpose-specific as a matter of treaty law, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights has nonetheless had occasion to
emphasize the function of torture in breaking the victim’s will.303
By explaining why torture is not simply the most painful form of cruel
treatment, but a qualitatively distinctive kind of wrongful treatment—a kind that
is not specified by the broader category that already guarantees its criminality—
298

299

300

301
302

303

NOWAK & MCARTHUR, supra note 280, at 69. See also id. at 558; IIFFMM, Detailed Findings (2018),
supra note 8, ¶ 162.
See Hum. Rts. Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), ¶ 4, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7
(1994).
See Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, art. 2, Dec. 9, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No.
67 (includes the CAT list but adds: “or for any other purpose”); Huri-Laws v. Nigeria,
Communication No. 225/98, African Comm. Hum. & Peoples’ Rts. [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 41
(Nov. 6, 2000). For a long time, the European Court of Human Rights distinguished torture from
other cruel treatment primarily with reference to the severity of the pain inflicted, and not the
purpose (overriding in that respect a prior decision by the retired European Commission of Human
Rights). See, e.g., Ireland v. U.K., App. No. 5310/71, ¶ 167 (Jan. 18, 1978),
https://perma.cc/8KNA-8RJE. However, the Court has since re-emphasized the purposive
element as an important distinguishing feature. See, e.g., Gäfgen, App. No. 22978/05, ¶¶ 88, 90, 105.
See ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 80, at 7, 14, 32.
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, ¶ 180 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2002); Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 542 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998); Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-424,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 291, 293–94 (June 15, 2009), https://perma.cc/8S279UER.
Tibi v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 114, ¶¶ 146, 148 (Sept. 7, 2004).
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Shue’s and Sussman’s accounts clarify why it is important to condemn that
particular wrong with precision.304 The weaponization of the victim’s biological
imperatives against her person is central to that explanation.

VI. S IE GE S TARVATION AS S OC IE TAL T ORTU RE
In the context of detention, the link between starvation and torture is
straightforward—starving detainees is one way of inflicting upon them the severe
pain or suffering central to torture.305 However, as discussed in the first Subsection
below, a belligerent using starvation methods in the conduct of hostilities rarely
controls individual victims in the manner generally thought to be necessary for
the legal applicability of torture.306 Equally, torture as a legal category does not
capture certain morally constitutive features of mass starvation as a method of
warfare. Specifically, as discussed in the third Subsection below, the use of
starvation in the conduct of hostilities involves a social dimension that has no
clear equivalent in the context of detainee mistreatment. Together, these
distinctions mean that the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is likely
not, and certainly not simply, a form of torture in the legal sense. And yet, the
parallels are illuminating. The torturous quality of starvation as a method of

304

Notably, since various other forms of mistreatment are both illegal and criminal under international
law, the purpose of this distinction may primarily be expressive. At the same time, it is worth noting
that this line can sometimes be blurred. Although focused on the line between categorical
prohibitions and those allowing exception (rather than the line between torture and cruel
treatment), the Israeli Supreme Court’s examination of sleep deprivation draws on a similar
principle, distinguishing sleep deprivation that is a “side effect” of certain forms of interrogation
from that inflicted “for the purpose of tiring [the detainee] out or ‘breaking’ him.” HCJ 5100/94
Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel, 53(4) PD 3, 28–29 (1999). See also Gäfgen,
App. No. 22978/05, ¶ 89 (on treatment qualifying as degrading when it has the effect of “possibly
breaking [the victim’s] physical or moral resistance.”).
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warfare distinguishes it from indiscriminate attacks or attacks on civilian
populations.

A. Control and Power
Consider first the question of control. It is possible that innovative legal
arguments to stretch torture (or at least inhuman treatment)307 to cover the use of
mass starvation in warfare will gain traction. The two most obvious interpretive
routes to that outcome would be to eschew a control element when one is not
explicitly provided308 or to interpret “control” loosely to include the capacity to
determine a population’s access to a sufficient supply of indispensable objects. 309
However, whether or not such efforts are successful, there are normatively
meaningful distinctions between the kind of control traditionally associated with
torture and that associated with conduct of hostilities crimes, such as encirclement
deprivation. Those differences suggest that there is some value to having different
legal categories for the condemnation and punishment of the two wrongs.
Whether isolated or widespread, random or systematic, the infliction of
torture is fundamentally an individual process. No matter the number of their
victims, those engaged in torture select whether, how, and when to torture each
specific detainee. Indeed, they control their detainees’ fates in a deeply intimate
way, determining when each individual wakes, when he washes, whether and how
much he eats, whether he sits, whether he has the means to read, write, or paint,
whether he goes outside, and with whom, if anyone, he interacts.
In contrast, starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is ordinarily
inflicted on populations. The besieging commander does not exercise over the
besieged population anything close to the comprehensive and forensic level of
control exercised by the torturer over the detainee. On the contrary, many aspects
of both civilian life in general and the specific lives of individual civilians remain
beyond her reach. Even on the limited dimension of controlling the supply of
essentials to the encircled community, the commander does not control
distributive allocation, sharing, sacrifice, coping strategies, or the arrangement of
family and social life around food and other necessities. These are not contingent
facts; the putative military necessity of encirclement deprivation is premised on
the impossibility of limiting its impact to specific persons (or categories of person)
within the besieged population.310

309

Suggesting inhuman treatment may apply, see Group of Experts on Yemen, Detailed Findings
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RED CROSS 1097, 1106 (2001).
See supra notes 279–81.
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This distinction regarding the extent of control and the degree to which it is
individualized bears on normatively relevant features of the relationship between
perpetrator and victim in the two scenarios. For Sussman, the torturer’s control is
essential not just in establishing the victim’s defenselessness, but also in enabling
the torturer to create a “protracted process in which pain is both inflicted and
withheld (perhaps even assuaged) in a capricious and unpredictable way.”311 This
creates the dynamic whereby the “victim is led to hope (however falsely or
unreasonably) that there might be something he could do to appease or mollify
his tormentor.”312 This, in turn, plays an important role in giving the victim
“enough freedom and rationality to think of himself as accountable, while he
nevertheless finds himself, despite all he can do, to be expressing the will
of . . . [an] enemy.”313
The relationship between the besieging commander and besieged civilians
lacks this intimacy. Operating on the population as a whole and accumulating
slowly, the aggregate effects of encirclement deprivation cannot be turned on and
off at will. There may be times during a prolonged siege when the besieging party
allows humanitarian supplies through, whether to divert scrutiny or otherwise, but
this mechanism is too blunt to carefully calibrate and control the swings between
suffering and relief.314 Once supplies go in, there is little external influence over
how they are allocated, used, or preserved. Amidst the combination of initiating
and intervening causes and the complexity of the relationship between individual
and collective suffering within the besieged population, civilians in that
community are unlikely to experience an identifiable “will lurking behind [their]
suffering” to which they may develop an allegiance in the form of their bodies’
demands for relief.315
And yet, despite these meaningful distinctions, there are also deep
connections between the use of starvation as a method of warfare and torture.
Although not comprehensively defenseless against that attack in the manner of
the torture victim, the civilian population is defenseless in the thinner sense that
its members cannot fight back on their own behalf without losing their protection
against becoming lawful targets.316 Indeed, on some accounts, the defenselessness
of civilians is normatively central to why they are not legitimate targets in war.317
311
312
313
314
315
316
317

Sussman, supra note 270, at 24.
Id. at 23.
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On the use of isolated relief to deflect public attention, see Dannenbaum, supra note 11.
Sussman, supra note 270, at 29.
See AP I, supra note 44, art. 51(3).
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It is reflected in the legal protection accorded them until such time as they take
on the means to defend themselves and others against an enemy force by joining
the armed forces or participating directly in hostilities.318
For those who decline to participate directly in hostilities, neither the fact
that they are protected in principle by the combatants charged with defending
their society, nor the fact that they could (unlike detainees) choose to pick up arms
and fight for themselves is accepted as a reason for their own legal protection to
be diminished.319 Shue’s focus on detainee defenselessness as a normatively
significant feature of torture reflects this—the contrast he draws is not between a
detainee and an undesignated person, but between a detainee and an enemy
fighter.320 There is a meaningful sense in which attacks on civilians, like attacks on
detainees, are attacks on the defenseless.
Moreover, although lacking the intricate and total control of the torturer, the
premise of a viable siege is that the besieging commander exercises control over
the encircled society’s overall access to essentials. It is in the exercise of that
blunter control that the besieging commander in a starvation siege inflicts a wrong
that is both analogous to and distinct from the wrong of torture. Like torture,
starvation methods distort biological imperatives against the self by crowding out
meaningful access to higher-order desires and commitments. Unlike torture, that
distortion occurs at the macro level, functions in at least two quite different ways,
and is not always purposeful. In these respects, mass deprivation might be
characterized as a societal analogue of torture.321
The first dimension of the distortion of mass starvation is fundamentally
political and more closely resembles the purposeful weaponization of the body in
torture. It is on this dimension that a besieging force deprives the population of
essentials with the purpose of breaking its will to resist. The second dimension is
social. It manifests in the foreseeable effect of starvation conditions in
undermining our capacities for the kind of commitments and bonds that underpin
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community, friendship, and love. It is largely independent from the goals of the
besieging party.

B. The Distortion of Biological Imperatives Against Political
Commitments in Mass Starvation
Starvation crimes are pursued for diverse purposes, including control,
collective punishment, ethnic cleansing, theft, and extermination.322 However,
paralleling the legal and theoretical focus on interrogational (rather than sadistic)
torture, the analysis here focuses specifically on the use of starvation to compel
the adversary to change its behavior.323 Like interrogational torture, this mode of
starvation is both the form most likely to be defended, in all of the ways already
discussed, and the quintessential form of the crime. Moreover, the wrongfulness
of other forms of starvation in war is captured straightforwardly by other criminal
categories, such as murder, forcible transfer, extermination, or genocide.324
Siege deprivation implicates the decision-making of the civilian population,
the military forces ensconced within, and their leadership. In the most
straightforward case, these actors are unified in their posture. As Walzer writes,
“[p]olitical integration and civic discipline make for cities whose inhabitants expect
to be defended and are prepared, morally if not always materially, to endure the
burdens of a siege.”325 Faced with a population unified in this way, the besieging
party seeks to compel a shift from unified resistance to capitulation.
Our commitments not to abandon our homes, our community, and/or our
system of political authority run deep. Like the detainee in Shue’s torture case,
some significant proportion of besieged civilians may hold higher-order desires
and commitments to resist the siege irrespective of the costs. Indeed, something
like this is the presumption underpinning Walzer’s ideal type. The inhabitants in
the scenario he imagines are sufficiently invested in one or the other of these
higher-order commitments to want to resist despite the cost threatened by the
besieging party. That is what it means to be “prepared[ ] morally” to endure the
promised deprivation.326
The goal of the besieging party in such a scenario is to shift that posture
through depriving the encircled population of indispensable objects and thus
escalating the burdens of the siege. It may be that the besieging commander
regrets the degree to which that entails inflicting starvation conditions on civilians,
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rather than on military forces or the political apex of the command structure.
However, in a context in which the population is integrated and the deprivation
is inflicted on the population as a whole, the commander’s regret does not
preclude purpose with respect to civilian deprivation.327 As such, even when the
ultimate goal is to starve out the military forces, a question arises with respect to
how to understand the prior deprivation of the population, particularly given that
it is well understood that military forces will not be the first to starve.
Short of literally starving the besieged population in order to get at the
military forces ensconced within (itself a form of extermination as a crime against
humanity), the alternative intentions (more in line with efforts to justify
encirclement starvation) would involve compelling a change in the civilian
population’s posture in order to change the posture of the military adversary. In a
population that is broadly unified behind its political and military leaders, that
would entail shifting the population’s posture away from affirmation of resistance
to the siege and towards capitulation. That shift could manifest in the limited form
of civilians’ abandonment of their homes and political community, or in the more
comprehensive form of their political agitation in favor of surrender.
Whichever of these ends it serves, encirclement starvation is not simply
coercive. The method does not function solely by raising the cost of resistance to
the point at which the besieged population calculates that the benefits of resistance
are no longer worth it. Rather, siege warfare aims to break the higher-order political
commitment to resist through weaponizing the biological imperatives of the
population against their deeply held commitments and thus to compel submission.
It works, to the extent it does, by replicating what Sussman describes of torture:
the suffering of hunger and the need to satisfy it is used to “crowd[ ] out every
other aspect” of the mental lives of those affected,328 precluding a “purely
contemplative attitude toward” the question of whether that suffering is a cost
they are willing to bear in order to realize their higher-order political
commitments.329
This weaponization of biology against will is not unique to the Walzerian
ideal of a politically unified besieged community. Even when the besieged
population and the besieged force are at odds on whether to resist or surrender,
the decision of individuals within that community not to attempt to overthrow or
flee the besieged force still reflects a strategic decision on the part of those
civilians. It is, in other words, a decision made in response to reasons. Those
reasons may be pragmatic, rather than rooted in deep political ideals, and may
themselves be responsive to a significant wrong (in the form of subjugation within
the besieged community). However, as commitments made in response to
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reasons, they reflect the wills of those who make them. To the extent a starvation
siege would “crowd out” the capacity to make even such pragmatic decisions in a
way that is responsive to persons’ ordering of desires and commitments, it too
would turn the victims’ bodies against their wills.
To recognize this reality is not to mitigate the wrongfulness of a besieged
party subjugating the civilians under its control or denying them egress.330 As
discussed above, the wrongdoing in such scenarios is not exhausted by one
party.331 The fact that civilians were coerced into remaining does not eliminate the
distorting wrong of using mass deprivation to compel their desperate exit or their
revolt against that coercive authority.
As in situations of detainee torture, many of those subjected to starvation
conditions in a siege may find it within themselves to resist until death or until the
purpose of the perpetrator is frustrated. Beehner, Berti, and Jackson describe
besieged civilians “weather[ing] severe hardships almost indefinitely.”332 However,
even when those targeted resist successfully, they are still likely to experience the
war between body and will. As does Sussman’s torture victim, they may “discover
within [themselves] a host of traitorous temptations.”333 The perpetrator’s wrong
inheres in weaponizing the victims’ bodies in this way, regardless of whether their
will to resist is ultimately broken. The wrong is not contingent on the method’s
success.
Understood in this way, starvation is distinctive from even a credible threat
of instantaneous death through kinetic attack.334 Until delivered, the latter exists
primarily at the conceptual level—where it remains subject to evaluation with a
“contemplative attitude,” and, ultimately, to control by the will.335 In contrast,
starvation tactics work slowly on the body and the mind, eroding the capacity to
prioritize higher-order desires, no matter how much the individual wants to at the
conceptual level. In other words, it is precisely because of its slowness relative to
330
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other methods of killing and harming in war that starvation entails a distinct and
torturous wrong.

C. The Distortion of Biological Imperatives Against Social
Bonds in Mass Starvation
The second dimension of the twisting of body against self in mass starvation
is both closely related to the first and yet distinct in certain key respects. In
crowding out persons’ responsiveness to higher-order reasons, starvation tears
not just at the capability of victims to uphold political commitments, but also at
the human capacity for friendship and love. It “constrict[s] the reach of our social
concerns and solidarities,”336 limiting the “ambit of [victims’ social] reciprocity”
within their communities.337 Although the erosion of social bonds through the
effects of mass deprivation is likely to weaken political unity within the besieged
population and thus contribute to its capitulation, this is unlikely to be experienced
as part of a capitulation to the adversary in the manner of departure or surrender.
Similarly, the besieging party is less likely to have sought to weaponize this form
of distortion. Nonetheless, it is the inevitable upshot of prolonged starvation
methods. Moreover, although there may be no specific experience of alliance with
the enemy, the war between body and self on the social dimension may be even
more wrenching due to the central place of social attachment in human life.
At the crux of the rupture of both social and political capabilities is the
demand made by one’s body in a state of severe hunger to take “drastic efforts to
preserve one’s own being.”338 Recounting the impact of that demand, Cormac Ó
Gráda writes that situations of mass starvation:
invariably entail much antisocial behavior, as the bonds of family and
neighborhood break down. Famine victims become desperate and
self-absorbed, and lack shame, their baser instincts prompting actions that
would be unthinkable in normal times. Famines erode hospitality, solidarity,
and community, and examples abound of appalling inhumanity and
heartlessness among victims.339

Observing such collapse, Pitrim Sorokin concludes, “to hunger, nothing is
sacred.”340 These effects are systemic—families in contexts of siege deprivation
are “forced to make impossible choices with the little food and water available.”341
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This can often take on a specifically gendered dimension. Alex de Waal
recounts that the “central women’s experience” of the famine in what is now
Malawi (and was then Nyasaland) in the 1940s “was abandonment by their
menfolk, leaving them to care for children and the uncertain mercies of
government feeding schemes.”342 Reports from recent situations of mass
starvation include stories of similar breakdowns. 343
De Waal cautions against the temptation “to suppose a singularity here: that
human beings are reduced to animals, and that extreme hunger displaces all other
emotion or thought.”344 Even in conditions of the most extreme deprivation
people make sacrifices, express love, and cooperate, often in heroic ways.345
Despite detailing examples of the kind of social and familial disintegration
described above, a 2014 report by the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights
in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea also notes that mothers
“experienced severe deterioration in their health, largely because they either
skipped or reduced portions of their meals for the benefit of other family
members.”346 There are likely multiple factors at play in such results, including the
displacing psychological pain of witnessing the suffering of one’s own children.
Nonetheless, it is clear that even in the most severe famine conditions, there is
“never a point at which humanity disappears.”347
This observation, however, serves only to emphasize the torturous parallel.
The wrongful distortion at the heart of torture depends on the detainee retaining
enough of her agency to maintain a sense of the commitments that her body
demands that she violate.348 Similarly, in the context of mass starvation, it is because
fundamental human commitments have an enduring reality that the countervailing
pain and suffering inflicted on the mind and body of the victims puts them at war
with themselves. That distortion occurs even for those able, at some level, to resist
the demands of their bodies and act on their higher-order commitments.
This distortion within persons combines into an aggregate distortion of the
affected society against itself. Notwithstanding his caution regarding overstating
the dehumanizing effects of starvation, de Waal emphasizes that famine “gnaws
away at [communal, familial, and intrapersonal] bonds of affection, respect, and
trust,”349 and argues that as a measure of the suffering inflicted in famine, “the
342
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severing of community relations may prove to be even more significant in the
longer term” than is the risk of death.350 He affirms what social anthropologists
have termed the “accordion effect” of famine, whereby each individual’s “web of
obligations” contracts and moral restraints degenerate even as “recognizably
social” functioning endures in “much reduced” form. 351

D. Moral Dimensions and Being Turned Against One’s
Higher-Order Commitments
The analysis above suggests a situation of significant moral tension and
complexity. Writing of the distinctive deprivations of Nazi death camps, Primo
Levi argues that kapos (prisoner functionaries within the camps) may be “the
rightful owners of a quota of guilt (which grows apace with their freedom of
choice),” but that:
in the vast majority of cases, their behavior was rigidly preordained. In the
space of a few weeks or months the deprivations to which they were subjected
led them to a condition of pure survival, a daily struggle against hunger, cold,
fatigue, and blows in which the room for choices (especially moral choices)
was reduced to zero. 352

In famine, Breandán Mac Suibhne reasons, this context of moral
ambivalence is such that judgment is, “at best, not easy” and “sometimes, but not
always . . . impossible.”353 Similar effects may be expected in a besieged
community.
The moral complexity of human relations within a situation of mass
deprivation arises from the fact that those who violate their own higher-order
commitments do so as victims of the besieging party’s wrongful infliction of the
conditions in which they act. More specifically, they are victims of the torturous
wrong of having their biological imperatives turned against their fundamental
commitments to their neighbors, friends, and loved ones. In other words, they
suffer the wrong of being driven to act against their own values through the
systematic crowding out of the space for responding to moral reasons.354
The normative structure of this dynamic is illuminated in part by considering
the situation not simply in terms of wrongfulness and culpability, but in terms of
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the first- and second-personal moral dimensions—burden and blame.355 When
persons within the besieged society are driven to violate key commitments by the
crowding effects of extreme biological imperative, those who suffer the immediate
effects of that violation may appropriately feel the kind of moral rupture that
underpins blame. This follows from having suffered a violation of the shared
commitments that underpin their bond with those who engaged in the violation,
notwithstanding the extraordinary conditions within which the breach occurred.356
However, it does not follow that it would be appropriate for external third
parties to adopt a similar posture of blame regarding that relational deterioration.
On the contrary, removed from the distorting effects of starvation, external third
parties lack the moral standing necessary to appropriately blame or condemn
those whose will is broken in such circumstances.357 To blame without oneself
suffering either the violation in question or the crowding effect of the deprivation
of essentials would express an unreflective self-righteousness.358
Those involved in perpetrating the siege are also differently situated on the
second-personal dimension of blame. Not only do they lack standing to blame
those who may have violated deeply held commitments under starvation
conditions; they (the perpetrators of the siege) are themselves the appropriate
recipients of condemnation from all affected by the siege, including those persons
who were unable to uphold their higher-order commitments in that context.
Indeed, one of the key wrongs for which such condemnation may be issued is the
wrong of distorting the biological needs of the besieged against their capacities to
uphold higher-order commitments.359
And yet, having suffered that torturous wrong, those who acted in those
conditions of crowding may nonetheless be burdened by their actions in that
context.360 Here, the question is not who may condemn, but whether the
individual who acted “can live comfortably with herself,” recognizing the acts in
question to be hers.361 The notion of burden reflects individuals’ ownership of
355
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their conduct and the endurance of their higher-order commitments, even as they
violate those commitments in the cognitively crowded situation of starvation.362
Individuals in that situation may feel both a sense of moral outrage with respect
to those who inflicted the starvation conditions and a sense of self-betrayal or
self-estrangement for having been unable to resist the force of those conditions.363
The cruel unfairness of that burden is itself a central aspect of the wrongfulness
of the deprivation.364
In addition to the struggle associated with having breached one’s own
commitments, the conditions of starvation may also elicit the unwarranted feeling
of failure (or the converse feeling of having been failed) that can come from being
unable to provide for one’s dependents.365 Here, the fact of deprivation attacks
the viability of social bonds and turns individuals and families against themselves.
This occurs not necessarily through crowding the individual’s responsiveness to
higher-order commitments or reasons (although the “traitorous temptations”
identified by Sussman in the torture context may exacerbate the tendency towards
self-blame, or even other-blame), but through overwhelming the capacity to relate
to oneself fairly.366

E. The Distinctive Wrong of Mass Starvation
In short, mass starvation in war inflicts at least two distinctive forms of
torturous wrong on the affected population. First, it places the bodies and
biological imperatives of the targeted population at war with their political
commitments, seeking to break the will of those with the capacity to make political
choices—whether those choices involve staying or fleeing, supporting the
besieged regime or resisting it, or advocating or opposing capitulation. Second, it
places the bodies and biological imperatives of the targeted population at war with
their social and familial commitments, leading predictably to a narrowing and
breaking down of at least some of those commitments. Even when commitments
are upheld, they are upheld over the biological appeal of self-betrayal. In addition,
362
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the suffering of dependents can itself provoke feelings of failure that overwhelm
the capacity to relate fairly to oneself and to others.
The political dimension is more central to the reason for imposing a
starvation siege. However, the second form of torturous wrong is important in
part because the social dimension is not contingent on starvation being imposed
as a mechanism by which to break the will of the besieged population. Social
distortion arises from the conflict between biological imperatives and social and
family commitments that have little to do with the besieging party.
The social dimension of distortion is important also because it is more
distinctive to starvation, as compared to detainee torture. Torture may be used to
override familial and social commitments (in addition to, or including, political
commitments). However, the unique rupture in a situation of mass starvation is
that the betrayal (or even potential betrayal) of one’s higher-order desire to
cooperate with, prioritize, and love others is not abstracted from quotidian
participation in those relationships. In contrast to the torture victim, who is
ordinarily isolated from those who may depend on her resistance—abstracted by
the distance of detention—the victim of mass starvation continues to participate
actively in the relationships against which his body tears at the very moment of
that distortion. Moreover, that distortion is likely to be experienced
simultaneously by all parties to the relationships affected.
The capacity to form and act upon higher-order desires and the specific
manifestation of that capacity in love, social connection, and political cooperation
are essential aspects of our humanity. Just as torture is a mechanism by which the
victim is turned against herself, starvation is a mechanism by which society is
turned against itself, with individuals suffering a direct assault on their
fundamental human capacities. That assault is a wrong that cannot be captured
solely by the harm, suffering, or even death in which it may culminate, even as
those aspects are, of course, key elements of what makes the practice
condemnable.

VII. R E SITU ATING S TARVATION IN I NTE RNATIONAL
C RIMINAL L AW
Recognizing the torturous aspect of starvation of civilians as a method of
warfare has several implications for how to understand the war crime within
international criminal law. It suggests the possibility of a category of war crimes
focused on the kind of distortion that links torture and mass starvation. It raises
questions as to how to think about the other wrongful facets of starvation crimes.
It is of potential interpretive significance. It could motivate the development of a
parallel crime against humanity. And it hints at how prosecutors ought to think
about investigations and charges in contexts of mass starvation.
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A. A Genus of Crimes Involving the Distortion of Biological
Imperatives
Identifying the normative connections between torture and starvation as a
method of warfare suggests a genus of war crimes defined loosely by the distortion
of bodies or biological imperatives against selves. Given the way in which
distinctions within the category map onto other ways of classifying war crimes,
the category may be best understood as cutting across several of the types of war
crimes discussed above, rather than as offering an alternative to them. 367 Thus,
torture might be conceptualized most effectively as both a crime of abuse against
persons under the total control of the perpetrator and a crime that distorts the
victim’s biological imperatives against herself. Similarly, starvation might be best
understood as both an attack on civilians and a crime that distorts the biological
imperatives of the starved against their capacities for higher-order commitments.
Although a full exploration of the range of crimes that might join torture and
starvation in this cross-cutting category is beyond the scope of this discussion,
there are several that are notable immediately for their analogous features.
In the realm of customary international law, the war crime of intentionally
inflicting terror on a civilian population shares notable features. Part of the
function of inflicting terror is to create the kind of accumulating and
overwhelming fear or panic that can crowd out the capacity of affected persons
to consider their higher-order commitments with a contemplative attitude. The
infliction of terror might, in other words, be understood to serve not only to
coerce, but to “break the will”368 of the adversary population through the steady
drumbeat of attacks over time.369 That, at least, is plausibly central to what
distinguishes such methods from other forms of indiscriminate or targeted attacks
on civilians. In contrast to starvation, where the mechanism of distortion is
physical, the weaponization of victims against themselves in the war crime of
inflicting terror operates primarily on the psychological dimension. Additionally,
the latter crime is unlikely to cause the social distortion that is central to the second
dimension of the starvation wrong. Nonetheless, at least in scenarios (such as the
siege of Sarajevo) in which a system of terror is maintained over time to
manipulate the psyche of those affected, there are significant parallels to the
torturous aspects of the starvation crime.370
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Other crimes cause distortion in a different way, forcing or coercing the
body into roles that contradict core commitments or principles of autonomy,
rather than using the body to crowd out responsiveness to those commitments.
The consequence can be an enduring internal dissonance and trauma. Rape, sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, other
forms of sexual violence, and the crime against humanity of forced marriage all
include a form of weaponization of body against self, alongside other wrongs
associated with the gendered nature of such crimes and the discrimination or
subjugation attached to them.
Notably in this respect, rape has been equated explicitly with starvation in
genocide jurisprudence.371 It has also been recognized as a form of torture.372 At
the philosophical level, Sussman frames his account of torture as “more akin to
rape than other kinds of violence characteristic of warfare or police action.” 373
This is not to say that rape or other crimes of sexual violence are reducible to
torture. As noted above, the differentiation of offenses within the category of
sexual and gender-based violence crimes is itself explicable in significant part with
reference to the value of precision in the moral expression of criminal law.374
However, the overlap spotlights the importance of the torturous wrong across
several war crimes.
A plausible case could also be made for thinking about several additional
crimes in this category of war crimes. For example, the war crimes of enlisting,
conscripting, or using child soldiers, compelling a protected person to serve in the
forces of a hostile power, and possibly taking hostages might all be thought to
manifest aspects of the distortion of bodies against selves.375 Here, too, there is no
manipulation of biological imperatives to crowd out the victim’s responsiveness
to higher-order commitments. Rather, the victims in such scenarios are forced or
coerced into roles that place their bodies into functions (whether a combat
function, or that of a bargaining chip) that run contrary to their presumed political
commitments or to the moral boundaries of childhood.
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B. The Multifaceted Nature of the Starvation Wrong and the
Interpretive Significance of the Torturous Element
To identify this common thread is not to assert its normative exclusiveness.
Starvation entails the infliction of severe physical suffering, disease, stunting,
transgenerational harm, mass displacement, and death on those not liable to be
targeted (or indiscriminately afflicted) with such harms, often affecting the most
marginalized members of society first and most severely.376 These are important
reasons for condemning the method and holding perpetrators accountable. The
same can be said of the severe pain and suffering inflicted during torture. The way
in which starvation methods put victims in a posture of internal conflict may be
distinctively torturous among attacks on civilian populations, but the wrongful
infliction of severe pain and suffering is itself sufficient for criminality and the
condemnation attached thereto.
Nonetheless, there are good reasons not to lose sight of the distorting
aspects of starvation in making sense of the crime. Although the normative
argument is not always transparent, those who defend certain forms of
encirclement starvation appear to assume civilian death and suffering to be the
key elements of the pro tanto wrong and then to discount the degree to which those
wrongful harms inhere in starvation tactics on two grounds.377 First, those harms
are not the goal of starvation campaigns that are targeted ultimately at the
combatants ensconced within the affected population and that aim for a surrender
that would obviate the escalation towards extreme suffering or death. Second, due
to their incremental escalation, the full scope of those harms is avoidable by the
targeted society through capitulation of one form or another.
On the account offered here, the slowness of starvation, as opposed to other
forms of military attack, is not a virtue, or a reason to appraise it as less harmful
than those alternatives; it is instead what underpins the infliction of a torturous
wrong that operates in intimate connection with the suffering described above,
but that is not captured by it. It is through the cumulative denial of biological
imperatives that those imperatives are weaponized to crowd out higher-order
commitments and reasons. The system of breaking the will of the besieged people
and tearing at their social fabric is possible only because the deprivation endures
over time.
Torture is prohibited categorically in the context of detainee treatment.
Recognizing an analogous wrong to be a central and distinctive feature of the war
crime of starvation can help to account for why that method of warfare may
appropriately be the subject of an equally categorical ban—a ban unaffected by
the possible military advantage of its use in a particular context and perhaps more
376
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(rather than less) robust than that applicable to kinetic attacks.378 It offers an
explanation for the “growing perception that, of all the ways in which death can
result from an armed conflict, starvation is one which humanely we cannot
accept.”379
Emphasizing the torturous wrong of the starvation war crime also clarifies
its role vis-à-vis the expressive function of international criminal law. That
function is dependent on a criminal code that captures the distinctiveness of the
wrongs condemned and that classifies wrongful conduct into different criminal
categories according to morally meaningful distinctions. Precision in that respect
is important if the system of international criminal justice is to articulate the object
of the global community’s non-acquiescence and to stand in solidarity with victims
and survivors in a way that affirms the scope of the wrong suffered.
In many instances, those responsible for starvation campaigns could, in
principle, be prosecuted for a range of international crimes.380 However, in
omitting the torturous feature of starvation, alternative categories would be
expressively incomplete, even when evidentiarily straightforward.381 To prosecute
a starvation campaign only as extermination, for example, would miss an
important dimension of the wrong.

C. Overlapping Crimes and Cumulative Convictions
Of course, just as the criminalization of starvation captures dimensions of
wrongfulness omitted by other categories, the converse is also true. Particularly
since it can attach without any killing at all, the starvation war crime is not itself
expressive of the wrong of mass killing. As such, relying on starvation charges
alone might obscure an important feature of the wrong associated with a massively
lethal starvation campaign. A full condemnation of the wrong in such a scenario
may require cumulative starvation and extermination convictions for the same acts
of deprivation. When such a campaign is inflicted with genocidal intent, a
conviction for genocide may also be appropriate. In cases in which crimes of
sexual or gender-based violence are part of the mechanism of starvation (used, for
example, to prevent women and girls from venturing to sources of food or water)
those, too, warrant separate and distinct recognition.382
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Doctrinally, the basis for cumulative convictions in such situations is that
the crimes have mutually distinct elements.383 The fact of that mutual distinction
is not necessary for, and need not underpin, heightened sentencing. International
criminal courts and tribunals issue sentences based on an overarching assessment
of conduct and culpability, including aggravating and mitigating factors not
captured by the elements of the criminal convictions.384 In exercising their broad
discretion in that determination, they have eschewed issuing consecutive
sentences for cumulative convictions attached to the same underlying conduct,385
seemingly in part due to concerns about double-counting.386 Seen in that light, the
value of cumulative convictions inheres not in the deterrent or retributive
functions of criminal law, but instead in its expressive function. 387 The objective
is a verdict that captures each facet of the wrongs done.
Expressive precision can also help to make normative sense of the absence
of a human consequence element in the starvation crime. 388 As noted above, that
lack of a consequence element can be explained in part with reference to the
evidentiary difficulty of establishing causation in a context defined by stretched
temporality and a complex multiplicity of overlapping causal factors.389 However,
the denial of objects indispensable to civilian survival is also the first step in the
distortion of bodies against selves. As in the case of rape as a form of torture, the
383
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wrongful harm arising from that distortion can be presumed given the action and
context, without needing a further showing of specific indicia of suffering.390

D. Starvation Beyond Conflict
Recognizing the torturous features of starvation that warrant distinct
expression among war crimes spotlights the lack of an equivalent crime against
humanity. That is of note both in addressing the infliction of starvation outside
situations of armed conflict and in scenarios in which starvation occurs in a
conflict zone but without the nexus necessary for it to qualify as a war crime.
Crises relating to the supply of essentials in Venezuela and North Korea exemplify
the phenomenon of contemporary mass starvation outside of armed conflict.
Meanwhile, a recent report of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on
Myanmar, found that “in the majority of cases” government restrictions on
movement and “deprivation of food and denials of humanitarian relief” were “not
directly connected” with the armed conflict taking place in Myanmar at the time.391
The most viable path to recognizing the unique harms associated with
starvation in crimes against humanity law would be via the residual category of
other inhumane acts.392 To qualify for inclusion in this category, an act must be of
a “similar character” to other crimes against humanity and involve “intentionally
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical
health.”393 This consequence threshold, although more legally demanding than the
starvation war crime, does not pose the same evidentiary challenges with respect
to establishing causation as is posed by extermination. 394 Indeed, it may be that
serious injury to mental or physical health could be presumed in cases of the severe
deprivation of essentials.395
There is already some developing jurisprudence of relevance in this respect.
The U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea has reasoned
that that “knowingly causing prolonged starvation” is a crime against humanity
under the “other inhumane acts” category.396 Additionally, the Iraqi High Tribunal
390
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recognized the 1982 razing of the orchards around Dujail as qualifying under the
“other inhumane acts” category of its crimes against humanity provision.397
Affirming and developing the notion of starvation as an inhumane act within the
residual category would allow for the development of a specific set of elements
and a direct recognition of that wrong. As discussed above, precisely this kind of
development has occurred on the issue of forced marriage.398

VIII. C ONC LU SION
The return of the use of mass starvation in war has reignited discussions
regarding the ways in which the law might respond to such deprivation.
Particularly since the amendment of the Rome Statute to include the starvation
war crime for NIACs, the criminality of starvation has taken on an unprecedented
political, legal, and academic prominence.
And yet, confusion endures regarding both the scope of the prohibition and
what the crime is fundamentally about. A doctrinal case can be made for a broad
and categorical understanding of the starvation war crime. 399 However, this Article
has focused instead on the underlying normative foundations of the crime.
For many, the pro tanto wrongfulness of starvation of civilians as a method
of warfare inheres in its status as a form of attack on civilians. That itself could
plausibly provide the basis for a comprehensive and categorical prohibition.
However, advocates of a narrow prohibition argue that the harm and death
inflicted in starvation contexts is mitigated by its graduality. On this view, it is
easier to justify subjecting an encircled area to starvation conditions than to
indiscriminate bombardment, because the slowness of the former harm allows for
its avoidance, most obviously through civilian exit or the capitulation of the
ensconced adversary.
That standard account fails to understand the role of graduality in the
starvation crime (and particularly in its instantiation in situations of siege
deprivation). The harm and death inflicted on civilians in a starvation siege are
clearly an important part of the wrong. However, starvation is more complicated
in its moral content. Reducing it simply to pain, suffering, and death obscures a
sense in which it inflicts a qualitatively different kind of wrong on affected
persons—a wrong much closer in kind to that which lies at the heart of torture.
Clarifying that distinctive feature of starvation can illuminate some of the
uncertainty surrounding the scope of the crime and clarify the function of the
crime within the framework of war crimes law more broadly.
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Beyond its intrinsic value and its interpretive implications, clarity on this
point also has implications for how international criminal law is practiced. A
number of commentators have called for the ICC Prosecutor to focus not on
seeking those most responsible for the gravest wrongs globally, but instead on
proceeding selectively with prosecutions with a view to drawing attention to
under-recognized criminal categories as a way of affirming their status, bringing
visibility to their criminality, and prompting judicial elaboration of their
contours.400 In a related vein, Barrie Sander observes what he terms “strategic
expressivism” in various stakeholders’ approaches to the institutions and
processes of international criminal law.401 On this account, international criminal
justice is a domain “in which different actors compete for the legitimation of their
preferred messages and narratives.”402 In that field of political contestation, civil
society actors seek to rely “on the language and institutions of international
criminal justice to achieve specific expressive benefits for their particular
communities of interest.”403 Whether it informs prosecutors or other actors
engaged in the politics of international criminal law, clarifying the fundamental
normative meaning of the starvation crime can shape how it is invoked and
applied.
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